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I
Abstract
Modeling in general is “an abstract representation of a specification, design or sys-
tem from a particular point of view”. System modeling is ”a technique to express,
visualise, analyse and transform the architecture of a system”. The Unified Mod-
eling Language (UML) is “a language for specifying, visualising, constructing, and
documenting the artefacts of a software-intensive system as well as for business mod-
eling and other non-software systems”. UML consists of different types of diagrams
such as Use Case diagram, Activity diagram, State diagram and Class diagram.
Each type of these diagrams concerns a different aspects of the system development
process.
Context-Aware Systems (CASs) are primarily associated with Pervasive/Ubi-
quitous Computing, which has became most prominent since the advent of smart
phones and the inclusion of mobility features in computing devices. CASs can sense
different aspects of their environment and use the dynamic Context Information
(CI) to adapt their behavior accordingly. Hence, various precis of CI, such as User
context, Physical context, Computer context and Time context, play a major role
in controlling CAS behaviour and functions.
Security is considered one of major challenges in CAS specially because such
systems often gather sensitive user information; this information may compromise
the security of the system if disclosed to unauthorised users. Thus, the design of a
CAS must consider system security as a major requirement. Although security is
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traditionally considered as a non-functional requirement and is delayed to a later
stage of the system development lifecycle, this thesis insists that security must be
considered as early as possible because of its high importance. This is also in line
with the “secure by design” concept.
Therefore, in this thesis the UML diagrams Use Case diagram, Activity diagram
and State diagram will be enhanced in order to enable them to model a CAS and
then capture its security requirements at the earliest possible stage of the software
development process.
The contribution to knowledge that this thesis makes is at least threefold, as
outlined blow:
• Enhancing Use Case diagram notations to express dynamic CAS functional
behaviour by showing the influences of CI changes. These extended notations
are then used to capture the CAS security requirements.
• Enhancing Activity diagram notations in order to demonstrate and clarify the
extended Use Case diagram by developing general diagram elements for CASs.
This helps to show the data flow during the execution of a CAS function, and
then present the security requirements.
• Enhancing State diagram notations to depict dynamism and security of a CAS
also at this level, and to ultimately support the enhancement on Use Case and
Activity diagrams.
These extended UML diagrams will be evaluated by applying them to a real-
world Case Study to show their practical applicability. The case study is about an
infostation-based mobile learning environment. This environment of Mobile Learn-
ing (M-learning) is deployed across a university boundary and provides a variety of
services such ‘download lecture’ and ‘do exam’ to mobile users.
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In conclusion, this research proposes and demonstrates an applicable approach
to capture and model security requirements for CASs using innovative extensions of
existing types of UML diagrams: Use Case, Activity and State.
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Modeling in general is “an abstract representation of a specification, design or system
from a particular point of view” [110]. System modeling is a technique for expressing,
visualising, analysing and transforming the architecture of a system. Here, a system
may consist of software components, hardware components (usually both), and the
connections between those components, all of which can be illustrated in a skeleton
model of the system [88]. The Unified Modeling Language (UML ) is “a major tool
for specifying, visualising, constructing and documenting the artefacts of a software-
intensive system as well as for business modeling and other non-software systems”
[19].
UML provides different types of diagrams such as Use Case diagram, Activity di-
agram and State diagram. Each types of these diagrams concerns different modeling
aspect. This thesis demonstrates that they can be profitably enhanced to capture
and model security requirements at early stage of software development.
Context Aware Systems (CASs) are primarily associated with Pervasive/Ubiquitous
Computing, which became most prominent since the advent of smart phones and the
inclusion of mobility features in computing devices. CASs are those which can sense
different aspects of their environment and use the dynamic Context Information
(CI) to adapt their behaviour accordingly. Dey et al [31]. provided a comprehen-
sive definition of context as: “any information that can be used to characterise the
situation of an entity. An entity is a person, place, or object that is considered
relevant to the interaction between a user and an application, including the user
and applications themselves”. For that, CASs rely on three key processes;
• sensing the context in the surrounding environment;
• reasoning about changes in context;
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• react to those changes.
As the CI that constitute CAS are rapidly changing, it is challenging to contin-
uously keep track of it while preserving the security and privacy of the system and
its users.
1.2 Motivation
As noted in the previous section, one of the most challenging features of CAS is the
system’s ability to keep track of rapidly changing CI, such as location and time of
day, as well as the presence of nearby people and devices. These constitute potential
threats to the system security. Hence, while capturing security requirements in
the initial stage of the CAS development process becomes necessity, it also turns
out to be challenging. Traditionally, security requirements have been perceived as
relatively static in nature, as access control decisions do not change with CI nor
do they account for changing conditions in the system/application environment.
However, the challenge of context awareness derives from the mobility of the user
and the changing context of his/her environment.
We select Use Case, Activity and State diagrams as the most widely used di-
agrams in the early stages of software devolvement though UML modeling. We
will refer to these three diagrams as our three “target diagrams”. Each target dia-
gram can be used to capture and define system requirements specially at the initial
phase of software development. It is important to highlight how limited the current
form of the target notations are, and at the same time, the need to extend/enhance
them to enable specifying the security requirements of a CAS. Firstly, current tar-
get diagrams are mainly capable of capturing and modeling the system’s functional
requirements; however, security requirements are known to be non-functional in na-
ture, and hence have so far been excluded from the target diagrams and the early
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phases of the software development process. Secondly, the current target diagrams
are mainly capable of modeling traditional system functions and behaviour that are
static, and hence the system design is not influenced by any external condition. This
defies the basic nature of a CAS, which is adaptable to its environment in a constant
manner.
As a result of these shortcoming,a new set of extensions/enhancements for all
the three target diagrams are needed to enable them to fully model CASs and their
security requirements.
1.3 Research Methodology
The research methodology used in this work is Constructive method, which is a
customary scientific research technique. In constructive method, the novelty is es-
tablished using an inventive architecture, prototype or procedure A very high level
expertise is required in the area of research to establish novelty, with the literature
plays the pivotal role [116]. Consequently, the suggested approach is composed of
five work packages; starting with review of the state-of-the art, then proceeding to
the proposed extension on Use Case diagram. The third and fourth work package
present how Activity and State diagrams demonstrate the extension that is done on
Use Case diagram. The last work package deals with a comprehensive M-learning
Case study, which is used to emphasize the practicality of the proposed extensions
as discussed in work packages 2 to 4.
1. Work package 1: Research background
Literature review is an exploration of the existing work in the field of the
research taken in this research and it mainly focuses on the research ques-
tions raised earlier. The literature review has been done mainly using books,
journals, online resources, peer discussions, and paper reviews.
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2. Work package 2: Extending Use Case diagram
Extending Use Case diagram notations to express dynamic CAS functional
behaviour and inculcating the effect of CI on CAS’s behaviour. These extended
notations are then used to capture the CAS security requirements.
3. Work package 3: Extending Activity and State diagrams
Extending Activity and State diagrams notations in order to demonstrate and
clarify the extended Use Case diagram by developing general diagram elements
for CASs. Extending Activity diagram demonstrates the data flow during
the execution of a CAS function. Consequently enhancing the State diagram
notations to depict dynamism and security of a CAS, and to ultimately support
the enhancement on Use Case and Activity diagrams.
4. Work package 4: Evaluation
In the final phase, a real-world case study is conducted using the proposed
enhancements; this case study is about a M-learning system. This case study
is employed in order to clarify how CAS functions can be modelled and its
security requirements can be gathered using the target diagrams.
1.4 Contribution
This thesis aims to develop an approach using UML diagrams to capture and model
the security requirements needed for CASs in an effective manner. Although many
aspects of security requirements and CASs have been studied, the combination of
the three aspects (UML, CASs and security requirements capturing) in one study
distinguishes the present research from others. The key contributions of this thesis
therefore are as follows:
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• Enhancing the existing Use Case notations to model a CAS, and then us-
ing this extension to capture the security requirements in the initial stage of
the software development process. This extension will show how the CI can
manipulate a CAS functioning.
• Enhancing the Activity diagram notations to support our extended Use Case
diagram; this guides builds a clearly structured framework for modeling a CAS
and gathering its security requirements through an Activity diagram.
• Enhancing the State diagram notations to support our extended Use Case dia-
gram; this demonstrates our new framework for modeling a CAS and gathering
its security requirements through a State diagram.
1.5 Thesis Scope and Research Questions
The work in this thesis focuses on the following issues:
• UML firstly this research focuses on UML diagram types, namely Use Case
diagram, Activity diagram and State diagram. It also provides their definitions
as well as the limitations that hinder their capability to model CAS then gather
its security requirements.
• CAS secondly this research targets a main technology as its main goal, namely
a Context Aware System, and the general notion of context and lifecycle.
• Security requirement this research aims at capturing and modeling several
types of security requirements, specifically Authentication, Authorisation, Con-
fidentiality and Integrity. In order to secure a CAS, these types explored in
detail and then innovatively incorporated in the modeling tools.
In the light of the above arguments regarding the scope of this thesis, the main
research question is formulated as follows:
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How to model CASs and gather its security requirements using UML?
However to answer this question appropriately requires, in turn, answering the
following sub-questions:
Q1. Are the current form of Use Case notations applicable to modeling a CAS?
If the answer is NO, then:
Q2. Can the Use Case notations be extended to model a CAS?
If the answer is Yes, this leads to another question:
Q3. Is the extended Use Case diagram capable to capture all the security re-
quirements, namely Authentication, Authorisation, Confidentiality and Integrity?
If the answer is Yes, this poses a new question:
Q4. Are the existing notations of both Activity and State diagram mature
enough to present the extended Use Case diagram?
If the answer is No,
Q5. Can the current notations of Activity and State diagram be enhanced to do
so?
If the answer is Yes, finally:
Q6. Can the proposed extensions for gathering and modeling the security re-
quirements of CAS be practically applicable to real-world case studies?
1.6 Measures of Success
The success criteria for the work reported in this thesis are as follows:
• The research questions must be clearly answered.
• A study showing how the proposed UML diagrams extensions contribute to
knowledge by advancing existing research in the area.
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• A study illustrating the advantages of using UML diagrams as empowered
through the present work must be provided.
• A large real-world case study to demonstrate that the enhanced UML diagram-
ing techniques can effectively model a CAS and its security requirements.
1.7 Thesis Structure
The first chapter is the thesis introduction, and the remaining chapters are struc-
tured as follows:
• Chapter 2: this Chapter provides an overview of the literature that influenced
the proposed research. The review will present background information on
UML and its various diagram types, security and its requirements in general,
security requirements for CAS in practical, and frameworks for modeling CAS;
the Chapter provide in the same time definitions for context and CAS.
• Chapter 3: this Chapter investigate the Use Case notations in depth, extend
the Use Case diagram to model a CAS, and then to capture its security re-
quirements.
• Chapter 4: this Chapter studies Activity diagram notations, refining them and
assessing their capability in terms of supporting the extension that was done
on the Use Case diagram.
• Chapter 5: this Chapter presents the enhanced State diagram to support the
extension that was done on the Use Case diagram.
• Chapter 6: this Chapter presents a case study in order to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the UML extensions proposed in the previous Chapters.
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• Chapter 7: this Chapter summarises the work discussed in the entire thesis,
highlights the significance of the proposed contributions and outline directions
for possible future work.
1.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter has highlighted the main aspects of this research, such as UML dia-
gram types, CAS and the importance of capturing the security requirements when
modeling a CAS. In addition this Chapter has introduced the motivation of the
thesis; moreover, it has clearly detailed the contribution, the research questions, the





• To describe the concept of modeling
• To introduce UML and its diagram types
• To explain the security and security requirements
• To introduce the context, context aware system and its lifecycle
• To review the context aware system frameworks
• To investigate the related work
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2.1 Modeling
Modeling in general is “an abstract representation of a specification, design or system
from a particular point of view” [110], [97]. System modeling is a technique to
express, visualise, analyse and transform the architecture of a system. Here, a
system may consist of software components, hardware components, or both and the
connections between these components [88]. System modeling is intended to assist in
developing and maintaining large systems with emphasis on the construction phase
[120]. The idea is to encapsulate complex or changeable aspects of a design inside
separate components with well-defined interfaces indicating how each component
interacts with its environment [117].
System model can increase reliability and reduce development cost by making
it easier to build systems, to reuse previous built components within new systems,
to change systems to suit changing requirements such as functional enhancement
and platform changes, and to ultimately better understand systems. In this way, a
system model can support various goals, such as documenting the system, providing
a notation for tools, such as consistency checkers, and can also be used in the design
stage of system development [97].
There are several ways of expressing system modeling [35], [36], [49]. Here, we
only mention the most used ones:
• Structural Modeling Language (SML): it rests on diagramming techniques with
named symbols that represent concepts and lines that connect the symbols and
represent relationships, such as (UML, Flowchart, Business Process Modeling
Notation (BPMN)) [113]. SML is concerned with visually describing all the
“things” in a system and how these relate to each other.
• Formal Modeling Language (FML): it is a set of strings of symbols that may
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be constrained by rules that are specific to it, such as (Calculus of Context-
Aware Ambient (CCAA) [106]). FMLs have a number of advantages over
informal languages, such as their precise meaning and the possibility to derive
properties through formal proofs [96].
• Semi formal Modeling Language (STML): it is language that may use stan-
dardized keywords accompanied by parameters or natural language terms and
phrases to make computer-interpretable expressions, such as (Object Con-
straints Language (OCL)) [44].
This thesis chooses the Structural approach to modeling CASs and their secu-
rity requirements. In particular, it will adopt UML to do so both because of its
popularity and because of its flexibility.
2.1.1 UML
The Unified Modeling Language(UML) emerged in 1994 through the Object Man-
agement Group (OMG) [19]. The OMG claim that “UML is a language for specify-
ing, visualising, constructing, and documenting the artefacts of a software-intensive
system as well as for business modeling and other non-software systems”.
As a result, UML has become one of the most popular modeling languages in the
field of software engineering [113], [67]. UML is mainly characterized as a graphical
language based on rules for creating, designing and analysing the system devel-
opment methods [95],[117]. UML is a very expressive language, addressing all the
views needed to develop and then deploy software systems. UML is not restricted to
modeling software, it can also be utilised for many other purposes, such as building
models for system engineering, business processes and organizational structures [3].
UML represents a set of best engineering practices that have proven successful
in the modeling of a wide range of complicated systems. UML generally offers a set
12
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of modeling diagrams specialised in the different view of information, hence UML
is very useful for both illustrating designs and understanding them. UML allows
the separation of concerns by using several diagrams in order to focus on different
aspects of a software system. Therefore, a number of different diagram types may
be employed in order to describe different aspects of the system at various degrees
of abstraction [61], [63].
Therefore, using the UML diagrams will provide a standardised way to write
system blueprints, covering conceptual aspects such as business processes and system
functions, as well as more concrete aspects [87].
The UML diagrams can be classified into two main types as follows [117],[91]:
• Static. This describes the static semantics of data and messages within system
development. Structure diagrams also define the static architecture of a model,
representing the physical and conceptual elements. Such diagrams are mainly
concerned with modeling classes, objects, interfaces and physical components
in addition to the dependencies and relationships among them [8].
• Dynamic. This entails modeling the dynamic aspects of the system. A dy-
namic model represents the interactions and the activities within the system
and with the users and the environment [8]. A dynamic model can be also un-
derstood as a description of the behaviour of the system over time. Behaviour
diagrams capture all the various interactions and instantaneous states within
a model while it ’executes’ over time [41].
The Table 2.1 summarises the types of UML diagrams:
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Composite structure diagram Static
Communication diagram Dynamic
Timing diagram Dynamic
Use Case diagram Dynamic
Sequence diagram Dynamic
Activity diagram Dynamic
State machine diagram Dynamic
Table 2.1: Static and Dynamic diagrams of UML
This thesis endeavours to explore some of the most widely used behavioral di-
agrams of UML Modeling notations, namely, Use Case diagram, Activity diagram
and State diagram. The reason behind selecting these types over the others are
that the selected ones are all classified as behavioral modeling types which help to
define and model dynamic systems. In addition the Use case diagram is one of the
means of gathering security requirement [29], and also the Activity diagram and
State diagram are very beneficial to depict the system dynamic behaviour [80],[72].
Therefore, the key factor that distinguishes a CAS from other conventional sys-
tems is that CAS behaviour is inherently dynamic (based on changes in its envi-
ronment), and therefore the selected UML diagrams will prove beneficial in defining
CAS behaviour and then capturing its security requirements. Accordingly, the se-
lected diagrams are discussed in the sequel of this section.
14
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1.1.1 Use Case diagram
Use Case diagrams are used to describe the abstract view of the functionality offered
by a system through specifying typical interactions with the system environment
[75]. Moreover, a Use Case specifies a sequence of actions (including variants) that
the system can perform, detailing how actors interact with the system [55]. A Use
Case is the core element of a UML behavioural diagram, and is a methodology used
in system analysis in order to identify, clarify and organize system requirements [95].
However, a Use Case was originally defined by Jacobson as, “a sequence of trans-
actions in a system whose task is to yield a result of measurable value to an individual
actor of the system” [57]. A Use Case has been classified as an effective method for
gathering system requirements from the user perspective, particularly during the
elicitation phase [38], [56], [6]. Hence a Use Case entails a group of different sce-
narios; each scenario depicts in detail a sequence of interactions between the system
and its environment (users and other external systems and/or devices).
A Use Case diagram is a powerful tool because in addition to defining basic
system functions, it also serves to test individual case scenarios in order to assure
that those requirements have been met [113]. A Use Case diagram is typically used
to clarify the high-level functions of the system as well as the system scope. Conse-
quently, a Use Case diagram is usually the first diagram that should be constructed
when a software engineer starts modeling a system. Thus, the main purpose of utilis-
ing a Use Case diagram is to help software developers to identify, visualise, organise
and clarify system functional requirements. In addition, the Use Case construct can
be used to define the behaviour of a system without revealing its internal structure.
Use case diagram consists of three main elements as depicted in Figure 2.1
15
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Actor
Use Case
Figure 2.1: Use Case diagram elements
2.1.1.2 Activity diagram
An Activity diagram is defined by the OMG as a diagram derived from various
techniques to illustrate workflows in a visual manner [117]. An Activity diagram
specifies the control flow between several components within a system in order to
depicts the main dynamic aspects.
Activities eventually lead to some form of an action, which is composed of exe-
cutable atomic computations that result in a change in the state of the system or
in the return of a value. An Activity diagram can affectively model the dependency
between the activities as well as the decision points that enable the branching of
those activities (based on specified conditions). An Activity diagram can also model
the synchronisation of activates and map them through multiple threads and to cor-
responding actors [95]. Typically an Activity diagram is used for modeling the logic
captured in a specific Use Case diagram [24].
Thus, an Activity diagram is similar to a flowchart in behavior, which illustrates
the data flow between the various activities of a program or a business process.
Hence, an Activity can be described as a state of performing an action, either a
real-world process such as typing a report, or executing a software function, such as
16
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a method in a class [20]. Based on the above, Activity diagrams can be used inde-
pendently of Use Case diagrams for other purposes, such as to model the business
process of a system or to model the detailed logic of a business role [24].
Activity diagrams can also be used to visualise, construct, specify and document
the behaviour of a group of objects [80]. In short, “an Activity diagram in its
basic form is a simple and intuitive illustration of what happens in a workflow,
what activities can be done in parallel, and whether there are alternative paths
through the workflow” [59]. The rule for reading Activity diagrams is from top
right (presented as the initial node) to bottom (presented as the end node).
Figure 2.2 shows an example of Activity diagram
17












State 5 State 6
Figure 2.2: Activity diagram elements
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2.1.1.3 State diagram
State diagrams express the dynamic behaviour of an individual object or compo-
nent; hence events may cause a change in state or execution of actions [33]. A
State diagram is considered one of the most important UML types for modeling the
dynamic nature of a system [72].
A State diagram is mainly used to provide a very clear abstract description of the
system behaviour, taking into account all the possible states of an object when an
event occurs. This behaviour can be fully described and represented via a sequence
of events that could happen in one or more states. A State diagram is very beneficial
in modeling the interactions between a class and the system interface, and also in
realising Use Cases [92]. It is also used to specify the sequence and time behaviour
of the objects in any given class (State, Event and Transition) [47].
A State diagram illustrates the discrete behaviour of a part of the designed
system through finite State transitions [115]. State diagrams can also be used to
express the usage protocols of part of a system. In some cases, State diagrams
are considered as directed graphs, as the graph nodes can represent states and the
labels of the graph edges can represent actions. Moreover, a State diagram is similar
to a flowchart in terms of notation; however, it differs from other types of UML
diagram, such as Class diagram, Use Case diagram and Object diagram, in that a
State diagram expresses single objects whereas the others describe groups of objects.
Therefore, a State diagram is imperative for both system analyst and developer to
full express the behaviour of the objects in a system. It can be concluded that the
main purposes of using a State diagram are as follows [72].
• To model the dynamic aspect of a system.
• To model the life time of a reactive system.
• To describe the different states of an object during its life time.
19
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Figure 2.3: State diagram elements
2.2 Key Concepts
As explained in the thesis introduction, this study concerns many distinguishing
aspects, in particular, security, security requirements, context and context-aware
systems and thus it is necessary to highlight each concern in order to identify and
define any weaknesses that could represent an obstacle to capturing and modeling
the security requirements for a CAS using UML diagram types.
20
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2.2.1 Security
Security in a generic sense means “freedom from risk or danger”; in the context of
computer science, security is “the prevention of, or protection against access to in-
formation by unauthorised recipients, and intentional but unauthorised destruction
or alteration of that information” [54].
Security is the one of the key elements that can hinder the growth and spread
of software systems. Security is devoted to prevent any activity that may pose a
threat to either the stakeholders or the system itself [118]. In addition, security is
a system property that should remain dependable even following malicious activity,
error or misfortune [109], [66].
In spite of the huge numbers of studies currently available on general security,
they can broadly be classified into three main groups as follows:
• Group 1 concerns the modeling of malicious behaviour and vulnerabilities (for
example, Misuse Case [107], Abuse Case [75]).
• Group 2 concerns the countermeasures and the security requirements, for
instance Authentication, Authorisation, Confidentiality, Integrity, Non-repu-
diation and Availability [95], [61], [108].
• Group 3 concerns the protocols and the transformations of sensitive data [13],
[17].
This thesis falls within the second group of security studies, with its focus on
security requirements. They will be explored in depth and then utilised in order to
define a secure environment for CASs.
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2.2.2 Security Requirements
Security is the subset of quality requirements that describe certain qualities of sys-
tem services [60], [111], [45], [108]. Security requirements specifically deal with
determining how the system is to be protected against any kind of threat [45], [99],
[58]. The role of security requirements is to provide information on the actual needs
of a system or application with respect to security in order to accomplish its busi-
ness goals [21]. Each security requirement is defined in terms of security polices,
which state certain constraints on functionality. Thus, any inadequate understand-
ing of the security requirements could lead to serious consequences, such as leak of
sensitive information, or even system failure [118], [51]. Hence, such requirements
must be gathered and maintained in an efficacious manner in an initial phase of
the software development process along with other system functional requirements
[108]. Security requirements are classified into the following groups [40], [37], [39]:
• Authentication requirement. This type of requirements seeks to verify the
user identity (whether an end user, an external system or other integrated
applications).
• Authorisation requirement. This type of requirements is defined as the process
of granting permissions or access to authenticated users to benefit from system
facilities. At the same time, authorisation denies access to system utilities in
case of a fake or unauthorised user. In addition, authorisation helps users to
restrict each other from accessing their perspective private information.
• Confidentiality requirement. This security requirement ensures that informa-
tion is accessible only by authorised persons.
• Non-repudiation requirement. This security requirement specifies the extent to
which the system shall maintain tamper-proof evidence recording all accesses
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made to the system.
• Integrity requirement. This security requirement ensures that system data
cannot be deliberately corrupted or modified by any unauthorised entity.
• Availability requirement. This security requirement prescribes that services
and applications in the system should be accessible, when needed, even in the
presence of faults or malicious attack.
2.2.3 Context and Context Aware System
To fully comprehend context-aware system, it is essential to define a fundamental
related point, such as what context means in general, and then to classify the context
types.
2.2.3.1 Context
Defining the term ‘context’ is challenging because it has a variety of meanings. Ac-
cording to the Oxford Dictionary, context is a circumstance in which something
happens or in which something needs to be considered; it also refers to time and
situation. According to the Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, context is “the
interrelated conditions in which something exists or occurs”. However, many re-
searchers are not convinced by such general concepts, and so they have attempted
to produce a more applicable concept of context which is related to computing. In
this vein some consider context to be the user’s environment and others the system’s
environment.
However, more prominent definitions do consider context in relation to both
the users or persons and to the systems or objects as entities that are found in
a particular circumstance, such as Schmidt et al [102]. They defined context as
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“knowledge about the user’s and IT device’s state, including surroundings, situation,
and to a less extent, location”.
Schilit and Theimer [101] define context by providing examples associated with
location, identity of nearby people and objects and changes to those objects. The
definition of context in Ryan et al [98] also includes location of the user, identity
and time. However Dey and Abowd provided a foundational and comprehensive
definition of context that makes it easier to identify the various elements that context
features. That definition is emphasised in the following box [30];
“Context: any information that can be used to characterize the sit-
uations of any entity. An entity is a person, a place, or an object
that is considered relevant to the interaction between a user and an
application, including the user and application themselves”.
This definition is adopted coherently in this thesis as the main working definitions
of context. In consequence, the context of a user can be seen as information about
the user and their environment [1].
Most research studies have provided various categories of CI, the majority of
which agreed collectively upon four major categories [78], [31], [46], [1], [105], [43].
These are as follows:
• Computing context: it covers areas and information related to system connec-
tivity, network capabilities, Internet access and speed, and other computing
related assets such as printers and workstations, CPU size and speed, mem-
ory resources, etc. Another important aspect of context-aware applications
in terms of computing context is that, in order to avoid the use of multiple
devices, users may at times prefer those devices that provide the facility to per-
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form multiple functionalities at the same time. PDAs and smartphones are the
most obvious example of this kind of devices, which allow for the integration
of innumerable applications
• User context: it contains information relating to the user’s application usage,
which includes the user’s personal information, preferences, current location,
potential activity, etc. The choices users make in determining the context
are related to their preferences. For instance, some users are willing to go
to any specified location by public or private transport, whereas others are
willing only to travel within a walking distance. For this reason, a component
or facility for storing and efficiently using preference-related information is
required.
• Physical context: it is sometimes referred to as the environmental context, and
provides information regarding current location (public or private), intended
destination, time, environmental conditions (light or dark, noisy or imposed
silence),etc. For instance, the user may require access to information such as
weather forecasts, route directions, on-going traffic situations or just current
temperature updates, and therefore this requirement should be updated on a
regular basis and made always available to users.
• Time context: it provides information about the time and the date on a daily,
weekly or monthly basis.
As we shall see in the sequel of this thesis, CI plays a major role in controlling
CAS behaviour [31], [46].
2.2.3.2 Context Aware System (CAS)
The idea of CAS was first theorised by Mark Weiser in his paper ‘The Computer
for the 21st Century’ [114]. Weiser also provided us with predictions for context-
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aware computing: “computers will come invisible to common awareness. People will
simply use them unconsciously to accomplish everyday tasks”.
Weiser professes that computers will be location aware, will have the ability
to capture and retrieve information, and will offer seamless interaction in support-
ing tasks. Context-aware computing as we understand it today was first presented
by Schilit and Theimer [101]. They postulated that “CAS is about exploiting the
changes in the environment in which mobile and distributed applications run, there-
fore, the system should have the ability to adapt to changes such as user location
or connecting host over a period of time” [86]. Moreover, CASs should have a
monitoring mechanism that can react to changes in the environment [106].
According to Sheng and Benatallah [104], the system becomes aware once it can
sense information originating in a particular context and can profitably use it to
provide services to users. However Dey and Abowd give a very influenced definition
of CAS [30];
“A system is context-aware if it uses context to provide relevant
information and/or services to the user, where relevancy depends
on the user’s task”.
It was stated above that, the context of the user can be seen as information
about the user and their environment [100]. Therefore due to the mobility of both
user and device, the context of the user is not steady but is changing irregularly.
2.2.3.3 Context Aware System Lifecycle (CASLC)
A Context Aware System Lifecycle (CASLC) can be mainly classified into three
stages, namely Acquisition, Reasoning and Acting stages [84], [71], [82], [2], [43].
Each stage has distinctive behaviour and special duty. The various stages are pic-
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Figure 2.4: Context Aware System Lifecycle (CASLC)
• Acquisition stage: in this stage the system senses the surrounding environment
and then captures a raw data or information about the physical world or some
aspects of it. In this step, CAS collects CI from the provider of CI and then
passes it to a CI repository for further reasoning.
• Reasoning stage: this is metaphorically called the thinking stage but, it is also
known as context manager. In this stage, the data collected by the CI provider
is processed and analysed in order to make it understandable and usable for the
system to take an action upon it. Reasoning mechanisms enable applications
to take advantage of the available CI. The reasoning can be performed upon
the basis of a single piece of CI or of a collection of such information.
• Acting stage: this is also known in some studies as context consumer; this
stage provides the physical world with the result of processing the gathered
data.
Theses stages are fundamental to the study presented in this thesis because they
will help to clarify the modeling of a CAS using the UML diagrams.
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2.2.3.4 Context Aware System Security
Security is a vital issue in CAS [79], hence and needs to be considered in depth.
Tracking security requirements of CASs relies on the explicit definition of the system
environment [11]. This is a necessary prerequisite to allow the system to adapt to
the new security settings following a change of context parameters such as location.
Context aware security is defined as “dynamic adaptation of the system security
policy according to the context” [73], [79]. The reason for asserting that CASs need
more security than other systems is related to the nature of CAS communication; it
is wireless and so the data are radiated to anyone within a range, whereas ordinary
systems use cables that circulate the data only to authorised persons [15]. Therefore,
many researchers have developed and collectively agreed upon certain steps that
must be undertaken in an effort to implement the most efficient and effective level
of computer security that is possible for applications running in a CAS environment.
The main purpose of these steps is to ensure that the level of risk is reduced as far
as possible.
The security requirements will be discussed in order to determine the security
steps that need to be taken in order to provide reliable security to CASs and applica-
tions. The sequel of this section describes the security requirements that this thesis
identifies as the crucial once to minimise the risk related to CASs [79]. It is conve-
nient to term them the ‘key security requirements’ for future references throughout
this thesis [4], [69], [76], [112], [118], [53].
Authentication is the process of verifying the identity of the entity that is seeking
to access the facilities of CASs and its applications. Authentication is essential
for verifying the identity of each node in the system and its eligibility to
access the network. The authentication function in a CAS is required only
once; it occurs between the user device and the context-aware infrastructure
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supporting the system. In practise,this means that nodes in CASs are required
to verify the identities of all communicating entities in the network. This is
needed at least to ensure that these nodes are communicating with the correct
entity and that the user who is trying to access the CAS is eligible to do so.
Mutual authentication allows pairs of communicating nodes to get evidence
on each other identity. Furthermore, in order to validate and run the Authen-
tication process, it is not always required that the user or device be connected
to the application; the authentication process could be done in terms of the
user’s context, e.g. location, Activity or nickname in an Internet Relay Chat
(IRC) room.
Authorisation in practice often follows authentication; it manages user privileges
by retrieving the permissions associated with the authenticated user within
a given policy. Therefore, the authenticated user should have permission to
access the required resource. In a CAS, the CI is utilised to manipulate the
user privileges. Consequently, the authorisation behaviour must be dynamic
in order to address the context change. For example, a university may control
access to its resources, such as a library, depending on circumstances, and
authorisation can also occur between two contextually aware devices, such as
mobile computers.
In the first example, the context is known, and authorisation is easily im-
plemented; the administrator of the infrastructure can therefore define the
authorisation policies in terms of these known contexts. In the second ex-
ample, it becomes more difficult, as users of contextually aware devices move
around their environment; they may be involved in several contexts, and may
wish to implement authorisation (based on these contexts) to the data they
hold. These devices may ‘swap’ new authorisation policies depending on their
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context and on the wishes of the associated users.
Confidentiality (sometimes called privacy in this area) is related to protecting or
restricting the use of certain highly sensitive, private or secure information or
data from being shared or being made available to anyone without permission.
Each node in a CAS must secure both the data that is exchanged and the
location information and other data that are stored on these nodes.
Although confidentiality has been vastly studied for traditional system, impl-
ementing this concept in a context-aware environment is a very challenging
task. Most of the studies in this field have claimed that it is possible that
users who wish to access and use the functionalities and facilities of CASs can
be somehow drawn into sharing their contextual information.
In order to ensure that such users do not unwittingly share or provide access
to their private information to other entities, certain methods and tools are
needed to prevent sensitive information from being accessed by others, and
the user’s location can play a key role in this regard.
Integrity prescribes that the data transmitted between users in CASs should be re-
ceived by the intended entities without having been tampered with or changed
through any unauthorised modification. This requirement is essential, partic-
ularly in mission critical systems such as banking or aircraft control where
data modification could cause considerable damage. Previous studies have
shown that integrity of user’s data can be ensured by guaranteeing that the
data cannot be accessed and then altered by fake, illegal or invalid users. The
integrity requirement in CASs is defined as a guarantee in which access to a
user’s resources is not allocated or assigned to any illegal or incorrect user.
Integrity instantiated to data is essential in CASs, especially when commu-
nication occurs between a CI provider and a mobile user, and also during
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data exchange, whether the data are stored in the main server or in the user’s
device. Thus, transferring data is a fundamental issue in terms of integrity
because it needs that data is received as it was sent to be guaranteed, partic-
ularly in a wireless environment. It therefore necessary to continuously trace
and monitor the data flowing through the system.
2.3 Framework supporting CAS security and their
limitations
Previous studies have proposed various frameworks for implementing efficient and
effective security on user information in CASs. The main purpose of implementing
these frameworks is to acquire and state various security-related requirements and
models. However, each framework has developed its own means of implementing
security requirements and models. For this reason, each separate framework is
valuable in its own right and worth of consideration. The following subsections
briefly describe the most distinctive frameworks to capture some set of security
requirements within in the context-aware paradigm.
• Confab Framework. Users should be able to apply certain privacy and con-
fidentiality controls, thereby protecting their private or personal information
from illegal access by unauthorized users. Therefore, in an effort to fulfil this
security requirement, Jason et al. [51] proposed the Confab framework. Specif-
ically, this framework is designed to provide protection and reliable security
for information that is relevant to the user’s location in a ubiquitous system.
Moreover, its working hierarchy is based on specific analysis relating to the
basic privacy requirements of end-users and application developers [103]. For
security purposes, the private information of the user is acquired, stored and
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processed in the user’s device, instead of being stored in some other device.
• Uniform Access Control (UAC). Covington et al. [26] came up with a uniform
access control framework specifically for serving the purpose of environmental
roles. Moreover, it has been declared and claimed as a further extension to
the Role-Based.
• Uniform Access Control (UAC). Bardram et al [16] developed a uniform Access
Control framework specifically for environmental roles and declared to be an
extension to the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model. In the RBAC
model, specific privileges or access rights for the user, in terms of accessing
the system services, are linked with the environmental roles. More precisely,
in this concept, a role can be a developer or a manager in a top-level domain.
Moreover, a role is responsible for analysing and determining the security
aspects relating to CASs and any applications in ubiquitous environments
[74], [16].
• General Role Based Access Control (GRBAC). Ahamad et al. [74] highlighted
the main difference between the RBAC and GRBAC models. The RBAC
framework is a basic model that only covers the subject-oriented approach
whereas GRBAC allows the definition of access control policies depending
upon not only the subject but also on other essential factors such as object or
environment.
• Gaia. A framework designed to assist in the building of ‘smart space’ appli-
cations [100], [14], [50] such as smart homes and conference rooms, consists
of a framework for building distributed context-aware applications. Gaia’s
event manager service enables applications to be developed as loosely coupled
components, and can provide basic fault tolerance by allowing failed event
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producers to be automatically replaced. Gaia’s remaining services support
various forms of context-awareness, which include the following once.
– Presence service: it monitors the entities entering and leaving a smart
space(including people as well as hardware and software components).
– Space repository: it maintains descriptions of hardware and software com-
ponents.
– Context file system: it associates files with relevant CI and dynamically
constructs virtual directory hierarchies according to the current context
[93].
• Roman et al. [22] defined generic context-based software architectures for
physical spaces such as Gaia. Moreover, they defined a physical space as a
“geographic region with limited and well defined boundaries containing phys-
ical objects, heterogeneous networked devices and users performing a range of
activities”. Depending upon this very physical space, active space providers
assist the users of CASs and applications to directly connect and therefore
interact with the physical space. Again, this framework is being used to cover
the security requirement that is called Access Control. Its main purpose is
therefore to define the giving permissions for authentic and real users to ac-
cess or utilise the system facilities.
• Kerberos. Kerberos is designed to achieve the purpose of fulfilling and imple-
menting various security requirements in CASs and applications, such as Iden-
tification, Athentication and Access control. Kerberos, however, is a frame-
work for which the center of attention concentrates on verification of the iden-
tity of the user who is requesting access to services and facilities of CASs. This
verification can be done by making use of data relating to the user’s context
which includes fingerprint, voice and face recognition, etc [22].
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• Context Toolkit. provided by Dey [32], it introduces the concepts of owner-
ship. The Context Toolkit makes it easy to add the use of context to existing
non-context-aware applications and to evolve existing context aware appli-
cations. New components involved in this access control are the Mediated
Widgets, Owner Permissions, a modified Base Object and Authenticators.
Context Toolkit provides context widgets, and they can be used as reusable
software components for accessing and interpreting context data while hiding
details. Therefore, Context Toolkit can support various domains of context





Gaia Authentication, Access Control
Kerberos Authentication, Access Control, Privacy
Context Toolkit Authentication, Access Control
Table 2.2: Relationship between frameworks and security requirements
Table 2.2 summarises the framework outlined above and the specific security
requirements each of them can handle. It can be seen none of the existing framework
allows for the representing of all the key security requirements selected above, namely
Authentication, Authorisation, Confidentiality and Integrity.
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2.4 UML variants supporting CAS security and
their limitations
In spite of the several researchers’ efforts in the field of context-aware applications
aimed at introducing extensions of UML diagrams for various purposes, there has
been no research using UML over CASs for the gathering and modeling of their
security requirements.
In this section, we present a number of past and current researches into UML
extensions whether utilised for specifying security aspects in general, or for modeling
mobile computing aspects in wider context. Two main criteria were used to properly
assess the strengths and weaknesses of previous research efforts; these criteria are:
• The ability of the proposed method in respect to model the context awareness
and the mobility aspect of the system using UML notations and diagramming
techniques.
• The ability of the proposed method to gather or specify security requirements
of the system using UML diagram notations techniques.
Choi [23] defined context and context-aware service as both concrete and evaluative
forms and introduced a requirement analysis process, context-aware Use Case dia-
grams, context-switch diagrams, as well as a dynamic service model based on those
definitions. His work is outstanding, and the extended Use Case diagram looks also
very intuitive. However, he did not s how CI can be presented. However, he did
not clarify how CI can be presented. In addition he proposed more notations which
make his approach to model a huge system very complected.
Hannes [81] presented some ideas related to the context-driven Use Case creation
process, and gave evidence for its advantages (compared with the goal-driven ap-
proach) using the example of the distronic function. He also noted the importance
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of context in Use Case creation, and thus introduced a process to capture context
situations. The main goal of such process is to bridge the gap between critical con-
text situations and the user goal by specifying the situations in details. However,
he did not depict CAS behaviour and the effect of CI on that behaviour.
Sheng et al. [104] presented a modeling language for the model-driven develop-
ment of context aware web services based on UML, emphasizing how UML can be
used to specify information related to the design of context aware services. Kang et
al [64] extended their previous research [65] to the use of UML 2.0 Activity Diagram
for modeling mobile agent applications, and discussed their computational models
to capture agents.
In relation to security requirements using UML, Sindre et al. [107] presented a
systematic approach to eliciting security requirements based on Use Case modeling,
which represents threats or abuse scenarios the users do not want to happen and
must be prevented or mitigated. Similarly McDermott and Fox [75] have adapted the
UML Use Case diagram to capture potential attacks by unauthorised stakeholders,
calling this extension Abuse Case diagram.
Jurjans [60] presented an extension (UMLsec) [61] that allows relevant security
information to be expressed within the diagrams of a system specification during
formalisation. Jurjans also developed an extended Use Case diagram for capturing
security requirements; however, his approach was only designed to describe the
situation to be achieved together with goals tree [60]. That approach is not well
suited to this research as it cannot describe the behavoure of CAS.
Houmb and Islam [52] proposed a security requirements engineering methodol-
ogy called SecReq. However, their work mainly aims at compensating the lack of
security expertise in software development teams. Mariscal et al [85] proposed an
approach to model security as a separate concern by augmenting UML with separate
and new diagrams for role-based, discretionary and mandatory access control, and
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providing visual access control diagramming techniques. Peralta et al [89] presented
a technique to specify UML security stereotypes aiming to guide developers by an-
notating vulnerable model parts, and to support automatic security test case study
generation.
Alghathbar et al [7] proposed a logic-based system (flowUML) to validate infor-
mation flow policies at the requirement specification phase of UML based design.
Alghathbar et al, introduced [8] an extension to the UML meta model with an access
control policy constraint specification and enforcement module, business tasks and
history log for method calls. The extension shows how access control requirements
of an application can be modeled in the design phase.
By contrast, in a different study, [6] Alghathbar focuses on the representation
of access control policies in the requirements phase of the lifecycle. In relation
to this work, Alghathbar and Wijesekera introduced [5] AuthUMLs, which is a
logic programming based framework that analyses static access control requirements
in the requirements phase of the life cycle to produce a consistent, complete and
conflict-free access control requirements.
Jurjens and Shabalin [62] developed a tool for the analysis of UML models against
difficult system requirements. More precisely, they described a UML verification
framework supporting the construction of automated requirement analysis tools for
UML diagrams. The framework is connected to industrial CASE tools using Exten-
sible Markup Language (EML) and allows convenient access to this data and to the
human user.
Alfonso Rodrigue et al [90] presented an extension of UML 2.0 Activity diagrams
which allowed security requirements to be specified in business processes. They
denominated as Business Process Security (BPSec), is Model Driven Architecture
compliant since it is possible to obtain a set of UML artifacts Platform Independent
Model (PIM) used in software development from a secure business process model
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Kang et al ×
√
Sinder et al ×
√




Houmb and Islam ×
√
Pavlich et al ×
√
Rodriguez et al ×
√
Karine et al ×
√
Alghathber et al ×
√




Alghathbar and Wijesekera ×
√
Jan Jurjens and Pasha Shabalin ×
√
Alfonso Rodrigue et al ×
√
Table 2.3: Summary of the above mentioned modeling methods based on the defined
assessment criteria
Table 2.3 summarises our short accounts existing UML works that heve variously
CASs and some security requirements. It can be seen that none of them is specifically
tailored to gather security requirements for CASs.
This thesis aims to develop a practical and comprehensive approach to both
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model CASs and identify their security requirements using Use Case, Activity and
State diagrams.
2.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter has addressed the critical aspects underlying the present. It has also
shed light on UML by presenting an overview of it was presented, following which its
diagram types (either behavioral or structural) were described. Then, this chapter
highlighted system issues by grouping them into two: those related to security in
general, and then those related to security requirements gathering.
This chapter also examined context, giving the main working definitions, and
subsequently examined the notion of CASs, depicting it in detail and describing
its security requirements. It then identified the key security requirements of CASs,
namely Authentication, Authorisation, Confidentiality and Integrity. Finally, the
relevant related works that have been conducted using extended versions of UML
diagrams were assessed in order to identify the gap that this thesis intends to cover.
In short, this gap is the capability of treating all key security requirements of
CAS.
UML is universal modelling language , which has been utilised and extended
for many purposes. In both areas CAS and security requirements UML has been
enhanced.
However there is no a single study devoted to model security requirement for
CAS using UML. As result this thesis was aimed to enhance UML diagram types
namely ( Use Case, Activity and State), which have enabled them to model a security
requirements at the early stage of developing CASs. These diagrams notations were
enhanced which became applicable to model the behaviour of CASs by showing
the effectiveness of CI in such behaviour, then latterly to model the key security
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requirements.
Furthermore, in regard to the chosen case study that has been presented in
this thesis is probably correct. The case study is modelled based on our proposed
enhancements on Use case diagram, Activity diagram and State diagram in order
to represent some scenarios.
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Enhancing the Use Case diagram
to model CASs and gather their
security requirements
Objectives:
• To describe the existing Use Case elements
• To reveal the weaknesses that hinder the current Use Case diagram notations
in modeling CASs
• To extend the Use Case diagram notations to model a CASs
• To gather security requirements using the extended Use Case notations
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3.1 Introduction
Use Case diagram is a vital instrument for both modeling system functions and
gathering security requirements; however, the existing Use Case notations are not
adequate to describe and model the behaviour of a CAS, which is dynamic and
should fulfill the key security requirements identified in the pervious Chapter: au-
thentication, authorisation, confidentiality and integrity. As a result of this, the Use
Case diagram elements need to be extended to address the behaviour of a CAS as
well as to enable gathering its security requirements. Therefore, this Chapter aims
to show how to extend and adjust the existing elements of Use Case diagram to
address those needs.
3.2 Existing Use Case diagram elements
A Use Case diagram consists of three main elements that must always be considered
in order to complete the system blueprint [75]. These are enumerated here.
• Actor: an Actor is any stakeholder, whether a person, an organization, a
device or an external system, that interacts directly with the system [41].
Moreover, Actors thus define the roles that users can play, and they can be
used to model any other element that needs to exchange information with
that system. An Actor exists outside a system, and is not actually part of
the system itself. Actors in Use Case diagrams are graphically represented as
stick men, denoted underneath by their names [10].
• Use Case: a Use Case presents the essential system functions to be performed
by the actors; it also describes how a user and a system interact in order
to accomplish some defined goal [25]. Each Use Case constitutes a complete
course of events initiated by an actor, and specifies the interactions that take
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place between that Actor and the system. The Use Case itself is divided into
two (similar) types: main Use Case, and dependent Use Case. A Use Case is
usually represented as an oval, and the Use Case name either appears inside
or outside that oval.
• Relationships: there are several types of relationships that may exist between
an actor and a use case(s) or a use case and another use case(s) [94]. Table
3.1 provides a summary of these relationships.
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Relation name Function Notation
Association The communication path between an
actor and a use case where the direc-
tion of the arrow specifies who starts
communication with whom.
Dependency The communication path between two
or more use cases to invoke an addi-
tional behaviour based on a condition.
Two stereotypes of this relationship ex-




Generalization A relationship between two or more en-
tities (actors) where the higher class
entity provides a generalisation of the
lower class entities.
Table 3.1: Existing Use Case relationships
3.3 Enhancements
Use Case diagram is mainly used to define the functional requirements for system
from user perspective, which is static in nature. In contrast a CASs functional
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behaviour differs from other traditional systems as they are rapidly changeable based
on context [28], [23].
It is not straightforward to communicate about, analyse, design, and implement
systems. For example, customers and developers have communication problems in
the requirement phase, and they may face this question: What context does the
system function beng developed need? [23].
The current form of Use Case diagram notations are mainly capable of only
modeling traditional system functions, which are static, and hence the system design
is not influenced by any external condition. In other words, all the system functions
presented by existing Use Case diagram notations are not subject to any constraints,
and so they are always available and ready to be performed when the user desires.
To support this, the example shown in Figure 3.1 depicts a student in an M-
learning system invoking << Download materials >> or << Do exam >>. A
normal Use Case diagram is represented with immutable functions that are not





Figure 3.1: Normal Use Case diagram
However, this defies the basic nature of a CAS, which is adaptable to its envi-
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ronment in a constant manner. Specifically, a function in a CAS may or may not be
available and performed, as it is based on CI parameters such as time or place. The
reason for this is that the function in CAS is subject to such CI, and thus once this
context is fulfilled or satisfied, the function will be made accessible; otherwise it will
be prohibited. Therefore, CI plays a critical role in determining the CAS functions,
whose modeling necessitates the inclusion of CI in a Use Case diagram.
Accordingly, the existing Use Case notations need to be extended in order to
support the description of context-aware features. What we mean here by mobility
and dynamic is that the Use Case diagrams in a CAS should have the full ability to
describe when the system functions can or cannot be invoked.
Therefore it is necessary to detail the shortcomings of each existing Use Case
notation and to highlight why certain elements are unable to model a CAS.
• Actor
A context-aware actor is proposed to enable actor-oriented scientific workflow
to be more personalised, adaptive, intuitive and intelligent; this is achieved
by modeling the logic related to quality runtime adaptations [12]. In current
Use Case diagrams, the actor is considered to be static, always interacting
in a fixed environment and enjoying stable behaviour and attributes. More
importantly, it is assumed that the actor is not affected by any effects in the
surrounding environment; hence the current actor is always able to perform the
relevant system function. In a CAS, the actor’s behaviour should be treated
as dynamic and adaptable to its current CI which, means that the actor can
be influenced by the surrounding environment.
Returning to the example in Figure 3.1 for further clarification, in the M-
learning system the current status context of the actor << Student >> is
online; then, once s/he sits for the exam, and the system realises that the
46
CHAPTER 3. ENHANCING THE USE CASE DIAGRAM TO MODEL CASS
AND GATHER THEIR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
location and time are for an exam, the student status will be switched to
<< Offline >> accordingly, which means that no other system functions
may be accessed.
In short, the Actor in a CAS must have the capability of being aware of
its physical environment or situation (context) and to respond proactively to
environmental changes based on such awareness. Therefore, a enhancement
that shows the dynamism of the actor in a CAS is required.
• Use Case
As explained above, CAS behaviour changes with changes in the environment.
Therefore, we propose two new extensions to the existing Use Case, producing
a new Use Case. One extension is that the Use Case (oval shape) is used
to represent the system functions and to identify whether the status of these
functions is optional or compulsory. It is impossible, however, to define the
status of any function in a CAS as being either compulsory or optional, as such
statuses are wholly dependent upon the CI. This idea was more extensively
explained in Almutairi et al [11].
For example, the user << Student >> invokes the function << Download ma-
terials >>, which in a normal Use Case shape is considered to be a fixed
function as it can be performed at any time and in any place. In contrast, a
CAS will check the CI first in order to determine whether or not the environ-
mental constraints will allow a function to be performed. Based on such an
argument, there is a need to extend the existing Use Case notations to model
the dynamic functions of a CAS, as well as to distinguish between the static
and dynamic functions of the CAS. Accordingly, the normal shape is altered
to a dotted shape represent function dynamism.
a Second extension stems from the observation that CI plays a key role in
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deciding whether or not a particular CAS function can be invoked. Thus,
our new type of Use Case, termed Context Information Use Case or (CI Use
Case) for brevity, which is devoted to presenting the required CI that needs
to be addressed in order to execute the Use Case functionality. The difference
between a CI Use Case and a normal Use Case is that the newly proposed
Use Case is not utilised to present any particular system function; rather, it
depicts the CI that must be fulfilled to carry out the system functionality.
• Relationships
We have now proposed a new type of Use Case namely << CI Use Case >>,
and this makes it necessary to define the relationships that can serve. There-
fore, we have developed a new type of relationship stereotype, called <<
Require >>, which indicates the relationship between the CI Use Case and
the main Use Case. This means that each Use Case requires a certain CI
Use Case for it to be executed; therefore, this new relationship is used to link
these Use Cases. The existing relationship stereotype types << Extend >>
and << Include >> are not suitable for describing this kind of relationship
because their behaviour is limited.
3.3.1 Extending the Use Case elements to model CASs
This section is divided into two parts; the first part is conducted to fully describe
the proposed extension of Use Case diagram to model a CAS. The second is devoted
to capturing and modeling the security requirements for a CAS using the extended
Use Case diagram.
As a result of the aforementioned shortcomings in Use Case modeling that was
highlighted in previous section, a set of extensions are proposed to the existing Use
Case modeling technique, enhancing its flexibility, so that it can cope with CAS
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behaviour [11]. The essential idea behind the proposed enhancement is to show how
the CI can affect the modeling of the CAS functions through a Use Case diagram.
This section continues by dividing the proposed extension that is to be added to
the existing Use Case diagram notations into two parts, as follows:
• Adjusting the existing Use Case diagram elements
• Defining new Use Case elements
3.3.1.1 Adjusting the existing Use Case diagram elements
The existing notations are limited in functionality; therefore, it is imperative to




Table 3.2 depicts our notation adjustments. It can be seen that both the stick
man and the oval are dotted in new notation.
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Existing notation Adjusted shape Description
The dotted stick man
indicates that the CI
can have an influence
on the actor, therefore
the actor is able to be
dynamic and adapt-
able in any a new en-
vironment.
The dotted oval means
the function availabil-
ity could be influenced
by changing CI.
Table 3.2: Adjusted notations
3.3.1.2 Defining new Use Case diagram elements
This is the most original contribution of this thesis, completing our extended no-
tation that assists in presenting an outstanding blueprint for a CAS and then in
capturing the relevant security requirements. The new elements can be seen in
Table 3.3.
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New elements name Shape Description
CI Use Case It is used to define the
required CI to perform
some system function.
Require relationship It is used to express
the relation between
the main Use Case
and CI Use Case.
Table 3.3: The proposed new elements to model CASs and to capture their security
requirements
Having refined some of the existing use case diagram elements, and having de-
fined two new ones, let us consider an example and apply the proposed enhancements
in order to demonstrate their effectiveness and considerable benefits. Let us consider
the same example given above, and assume that there is required CI that must be
checked first, as follows:
• Download materials: in order to invoke this service, the user must be within
university boundary, say in location A. Additionally, the student status must
be << Online >>.
• Do exam: in order to invoke this service, the student must be in a predefined
location within the university, say in location B, and at a predefined time,
say between 10:00 and 12:00. Additionally, the student status must be <<
Offline >>.
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Student  status= Offline
require 
require 
Figure 3.2: Extended Use Case diagram
From the new diagram, it can be clearly defined all the required CI; the function
is not available unless this context is fulfilled. Having provided a clear explanation
of the adjusted Use Case diagram, A Use-Case Specification (UCS) provides full
textual details for a Use Case [18], as may be seen in the Table 3.4 for <<
Download materials >> function.
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Name Description
Actor Student.
Main function Download materials.
Brief description The student can download the required ma-
terials.
Context Information Location= A. Student status= Online.
Pre-condition the student must be authenticated.
Post condition The student must be having the proper CI
to carry on downloading.
Flow of events
1. The student requests downloading ma-
terials the invokes a function
2. CAS checks whether the student has
gained the required CI
3. CAS provides the requested materials
to the student
Table 3.4: Description of Use Case diagram
To sum up this section, were presented a number of changes to the Use Case
notations to enable the use of Use Case diagram in order to model dynamic systems,
which is precisely the nature of CASs. These changes included the use of a new set
of notations in the Use Case Model to enable the representation of CI and its effect
on CAS functions. The Table 3.5 provides a compact comparison between the
existing Use Case diagram, termed ‘Normal Use Case’ and our enhanced version,
termed ‘Extended Use Case’.
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Table 3.5: Typical VS Adjusted Use Case Diagram
3.3.2 Gathering security requirements for CASs using the
extended Use Case
Having provided a robust approach to modeling a CAS, we now need to gather
the key security requirements. The Use Case diagram notations could be used to
describe such requirements but is limited and found unable to model Integrity. Pre-
cisely, an Integrity prescribes to track information while it flows from an initial point
to a final one, for example, user A sending a message to user B and, additionally,
the receiver needs to know whether or not the data have been corrupted during
the transfer. The nature of a Use Case diagram makes it unable to describe such
requirement, and therefore we observe that a Use Case diagram is not capable of
modeling all key security requirements.
Hence, in this section we concentrate on how to gather the other key security
requirements, specifically Authentication, Authorisation and Confidentiality, for a
CAS using our adjusted Use Case diagram. Theses observations are summarised in
Table 3.6 which presents the security requirements that can or cannot be modeled
in a Use Case diagram.
However, Integrity will be modeled in the sequel of this thesis, at the level of
Activity and State diagrams, as we shall see.
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Table 3.6: Presenting security requirement using Use Case diagram
In the Section below, the adjusted Use Case diagram is employed to show how the
security requirements for a CAS can be gathered and modeled. This will necessitate
the inclusion of a few new elements in order to reflect the meaning of each security
requirement. It is worth mentioning that the CI will also be the main factor in
defining and managing the system’s security requirements.
3.3.2.1 Authentication
Authentication is the first stage in securing system in general [34]; it entails verify-
ing the user identity by checking certain authentication parameters, such as user-
name/password, location, time, etc.
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Figure 3.3: Authentication process in CAS
As stated in Chapter 2, the authentication process in a CAS differs from how it
is carried out in other systems. It must be continuously re-iterated because the user
environment is rapidly changing, which can possibly result in the user becoming
unauthenticated by failing to satisfy the authentication parameters [70], [48]. Thus,
in order to authenticate system users using Use Case diagram, we accordingly group
two kinds of context parameter that must be addressed in verifying the user identity,
as follows:
1. Static parameters: these are fixed details such as username/password and
device IP address.
2. Dynamic parameters: these are changeable based on user context such as user
location; this type is imperative, as the user needs to be continuously tracked
to ensure their secure access to the system.
The authentication process can be presented in a Use Case diagram by expressing
the login stage, which requires verifying both static verification details (such as
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username/password) and dynamic ones (such as location,time etc..). For example
in M-learning system the student has to have valid access details as well as be in






Figure 3.4: Authentication Use Case diagram
As shown in Figure 3.4, the student needs certain CI in order to pass the
authentication stage to access and display the M-learning functions. The dotted
shapes demonstrates how the diagram benefits from the enhancements we have
described above.
Table 3.7 details how authentication information is captured; it describes all
elements of the diagram.
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Precondition The student must be within the university bound-
ary.
Post-condition The student must not leave the university.
Flow of events
1. Student enters username password
2. CAS verifies the student Location
3. CAS check all the provided CI
4. CAS displays the functions
Table 3.7: Description of Authentication Use Case diagram
3.3.2.2 Authorisation
Authorisation concerns permitting or denying privileges to users, and thus CI plays a
major role in this. This implies that authorisation is particulary difficult to enforce
within a CAS. This service follows the authentication stage. Although Use Case
diagrams can visually present the behavioral system requirements, they are not
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fully able to represent existing authorisation policies. At best, a Use Case diagram
can show some authorisation by stating the roles that actors are permitted to invoke
[6], [9]. Therefore, it is imperative to state through the extended Use Case diagram
how the CI can impact on the system’s decision of either permitting or denying an














Figure 3.5: Authorisation process in CAS
The Figure 3.5 shows the impact that CI can have on the CAS function when
presented by a Use Case. For instance, once the user decides to invoke an available
service, s/he needs to provide certain CI and to fulfil certain constraints to be able
perform that service; for example, in our running example of an M-learning system,
the user << Student >> may want to download some files from the database;
however, the downloading materials function requires certain CI and constrains to
be in place, such as the user being in a particular location. Time may also be involved
(e.g. between 9:00 and 17:00), and so once the student has fulfilled the necessary
requirements, s/he can invoke the download function; otherwise, the service will be
denied.
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Thus, in order to present this, a new elements are defined for a use cases, namely
<< Permit >> and << Deny >>. Although these terms have been represented
before as scenarios [6], they are adopted here without ambiguity, as use cases that
are involved in the same Use Case diagram. This will help to reduce the complexity
of Use Case description. We shall see that the performance of << Permit >> and
<< Deny >> use cases is namely their outcome totally dependent on the user CI.
The Table 3.6 describes the new use cases.
New Use Case name Shape Description
Permit
permit
It means that the user
has fulfilled the CI




It means that the cur-
rent user CI is not con-
sistent with the func-
tion requirements.
Table 3.8: The proposed Authorisation Use Cases
These new use cases << Permit >> and << Deny >> can be used continuously
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(according to the CI). The example 3.6 depicts how the actor can invoke the service
once the CI has been fulfilled, and vice versa (i.e. how he cannot if the user CI is
not satisfactory). The reason for not providing as the shape of the classical use case
is that << Permit >> and << Deny >> use cases are not part of the system












Figure 3.6: Authorisation Use Case diagram
The Table 3.9 explains the Use Case Authorisation in depth by providing all
the details in the diagram:
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Name Description
Name of system user Student.
Main function Download materials.
Brief description
The student can access Download materials function
once s/he acquires the required CI, therefore once the
CAS approves these, the student will be permitted, oth-
erwise will be denied.
Security requirement Authorisation.
CI Location: A. Time: 8:00-21:00.
Precondition Student must remain having the proper CI.
Post-condition Student must remain gaining the authorised parameters.
Flow of events
1. Student requests download materials function
2. CAS verifies the student CI
3. CAS provides the requested materials
4. CAS continuously checks the student CI
5. CAS denies the service once the student CI is not
applicable
Table 3.9: Description of Authorisation Use Case diagram
It can be seen that the authorisation mechanism can now be managed thanks to
our enhanced notation and, in particular, the privileges for the user can be controlled
by continuously monitoring the user context. In short, the chief benefits of our
enhancement is that they simplify defining where and when a service can be granted
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or denied in a CAS.
3.3.2.3 Confidentiality
Confidentiality is a significant requirement for a CAS and, as such, should be clearly
captured in the Use Case diagram. It generally concerns protecting and hiding data
from unauthorised persons or third parties. As explained above, each CAS function
is inherently dynamic because it is granted depending upon the calling user’s context
information.
For the sake of demonstration, we consider a user who has been authorised to
access a CAS function. We also assume that the function handles sensitive data,
hence their confidentiality becomes an important requirement. Accordingly, the
CAS will release the function to the user if and only if the user sits in a predefined
safe location such as his/her office.
Thus, user location has been used as crucial context parameter [51] to influence
the hiding of the data handled by the CAS function; as a result, user location will be
exploited here to demonstrate how to model confidentiality in a CAS. It is assumed
that:
the service has been already granted to the user, which means the user
has satisfied the required CI. Thereafter, the system will continually
check only the user location to control that service.
The Figure 3.7 shows the mechanism for protecting the data once the service is
running.
63
CHAPTER 3. ENHANCING THE USE CASE DIAGRAM TO MODEL CASS












(Hide – Release) 
sensitive information
Figure 3.7: Confidentiality process in CAS
Consequently, the hidden data will be dynamically hidden upon the based of
user location. In consequence, presenting confidentiality in a Use Case is slightly
different from presenting other security requirements such as authentication and au-
thorisation. As result, we propose a new use case called << Show information >>,
as depicted in the Table 3.10, to enhance the proposed Use Case diagram in order
to clearly present confidentiality for CASs.
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Table 3.10: The proposed Confidentiality Use Case
To illustrate the above explanation with an example, we build the Use Case
diagram in Figure 3.8. If a doctor wishes to check the record of a patient, the doctor
must be located in his/her private office to be able to do the check successfully.










Figure 3.8: Confidentiality Use Case diagram
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The Table 3.11 explains the Use Case Confidentiality in depth by providing all
the details in the diagram:
Name Description
Name of system user Doctor.
Main function Check patient’s record.
Brief description Doctor checks the patient’s record.
Security requirement Confidentiality.
Private location Doctor office.
Sensitive Information patient’s age. patient’s medical history.
Context Information Location.
Precondition Doctor must be located in his/her office.
Post-condition
Doctor location must not be changed, otherwise the pa-
tient sensitive information will be hidden.
Flow of events
1. The Doctor invokes a function
2. CAS checks the Doctor location
3. CAS hides any sensitive user information once the
Doctor location is deemed not private
Table 3.11: Description of Confidentiality Use Case diagram
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3.4 Chapter Summary
In this Chapter, the researcher has studied how the Use Case notations can be made
applicable to modeling a CAS, and then how the key security requirements can be
gathered.
The Chapter started by detailing the proposed enhancements to the Use Case
notations, which can greatly enrich their capability in modeling CASs. Then, this
Chapter provided examples using our enhancements to depict how CI can affect the
behaviour of CAS function.
Then the Chapter described the approach taken to gathering the security require-
ments, specifically authentication, authorisation and confidentiality, by utilising the
extended Use Case diagram. Furthermore it clarified why the integrity could not be
presented through Use Case diagram.
In addition this Chapter showed how the CI can play a major role in securing a
CAS, either in the authentication stage, which can use static parameters and certain
dynamic once, or in the authorisation stage, which can be managed by some CI to
control the user privileges, and finally in the confidentiality stage, which exploited
user location in order to modulate the release of data.
In short, this Chapter has presented our innovative framework to model CASs
and gather most of their key security requirements by Use Case diagram.
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Chapter 4
Enhancing the Activity diagram to
support the extended Use Case
diagram for CASs and gather their
security requirements
Objectives:
• To describe the existing Activity diagram elements and their weaknesses in
modeling CASs and their security requirements
• To extend the Activity diagram notations to model a CAS
• To use the extended Activity diagram to further demonstrate the extended
Use Case diagram of the previous Chapter
• To gather security requirements using the extended Activity diagram
• To specifically target the Integrity requirement, which could not captured at
Use Case level
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to describe how the Activity diagram can be used to develop a
unique framework for modeling CASs. The main purpose of utilising an Activity
diagram is to clarify each Use Case scenario. This will assist in demonstrating the
value of the extension advanced on Use Case diagram and described in the previous
chapter.
4.2 Existing an Activity diagram elements
For completeness of the presentation, we begin by outlining the main elements of
Activity diagram. Typically well known to software developers, these are [24]:
• Initial (start) node: indicates the beginning of a workflow in an Activity dia-
gram; it is drawn as a solid black circle.
• Control flow (Transition): an arrow showing the direction of the process be-
tween two or more actions or elements in the Activity diagram. It is drawn as
a solid line with an open arrowhead.
• Action state (Activity): a model element that represents the performance of
a task in the workflow or an operation in the process. It is presented as a
capsule-shaped rounded rectangle with a name or description.
• Decision: a choice for a workflow to proceed along one of a number of pos-
sible paths, according to the guard conditions, which has only one incoming
transition and has multiple outgoing transitions. It is presented as a diamond
shape.
• Swimlane : it divides activity diagrams into sections. Each swimlane is sepa-
rated from adjacent swimlanes by vertical, solid lines on both sides.
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• Merge: a number of flows leading to the same Activity. It is indicated as a
diamond with several flows entering and one leaving.
• Synchronization: a facility for the modeling of simultaneous workflows. It is
of two different types:
– Fork: this is presented as a bar with one incoming transition and two or
more outgoing transitions.
– Join: this is presented as a bar with two or more incoming transitions
and only one outgoing transition.
• End (final) node: indicates the end of the workflow. The end state is drawn
as a filled circle inside a large unfilled circle. The name on it is optional.
4.3 Enhancements
As stated previously, a CAS depends totally on the CI and originating in a certain
context. In contrast, one of the advantages of an Activity diagram is that it can show
the sequence and conditions for action execution [27], [24]. Moreover, an Activity
diagram can also be used to specify the behaviour of parameters as well as the
conditions that control each function (based on the gathered CI).
Therefore using an Activity diagram to model the behaviour of a CAS is in-
credibly fruitful, as we shall see. Before we engage with innovative extensions, it is
necessary to evaluate the existing Activity diagram notation to assess whether or not
it is applicable to efficiently present CAS behaviour. To the best of our knowledge,
there seem to exist no studies conducting such assessment. We observe that using
Activity diagram to model a CAS necessitates finding a suitable representation of
object movement in order to make tracing and tracking the object in CAS possible.
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More importantly, the notation ought to be able to show the influence of changing
CI on CAS functions.
In consequence, we propose a general model notation by taking into account the
sequential process of the object within a CAS (from the gathering and sensing CI
stage, then passing through the processing stage, until reaching the acting stage in
order to deliver the service). The behaviour of CASs will be depicted by presenting
the main CAS action states as well as their functions, all of which must be possible
in any CAS, regardless of their nature. In addition, it can be clarified who can carry
out the system functions and where they can be carried out. In consequence, we
prescribe that:
There are only two main swimlanes, namely << User >> and <<
Context Aware System >>, which describe the interaction between
the system user and the CAS.
Each swimlane contains the possible functions that can be invoked through it.
The user swimlane represents the functions that the user can do, whereas the CAS
swimlane contains all the functions that the system can do and provide. For ex-
ample, the << Login >> action state is only performed by the user, whereas
<< Get CI >> can only be done within the CAS. These can be seen in Figure 4.1,
which illustrates several functions:
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Figure 4.1: CAS Activity diagram framework
Figure 4.1 clearly shows the two main swimlanes, which represent the interac-
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tion between the system user and the CAS. Table 4.1 describes the CAS functions
grouped by the swimlanes in which they can be performed.
User swimlane functions Context Aware System swimlane functions
Login Get CI
Using system Is CI consistent with requested function
Has saved CI changed
Get a new CI
Is CI still applicable for current function
Adapt a new CI
Is adaptation of new CI successful
Terminate running function
Table 4.1: CAS swimlanes functions
We have now defined all the CAS functions; it is therefore now time to classify
the CAS stages and to determine where each function can be run. For example, the
<< Get CI >> action state is considered as a context acquisition (gathering) stage,
which collects all the CI (upon which the rest of the system depends). On the other
hand, the reasoning stage mainly controls all the CAS functions by checking whether
or not the CI that has been gathered is applicable, which can be done through the
condition << Is CI consistent with requsted function >>. Finally, and based on
processing the user request, the acting stage yields the result, which is presented in
<< Using system >>.
As we discussed in the literature review (Chapter 2), Context-Aware System
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• Context Acting.
The reason for mentioning these types again here is to state that they will be
exploited to demonstrate where/how data can flow in a CAS via an Activity diagram;
as well as to define precisely where the system function is invoked. Therefore, we
advance the following enhancement to depict the CASLC clearly.
• Sub-swimlanes: as explained above in the Activity diagram elements, there is a
swimlane to present a certain separated system; however, in a CAS we need to
divide that swimlane into three parts (sub-swimlanes) to illustrate the CASLC.
The reason behind this is that the CASLC is not a different and separate
system; rather, the three are all parts of one swimlane and are connected to
each other (although each sub-swimlane does have a certain duty).
Notation name Proposed notation shape Description
Sub-swimlane
Sub-swimlane
To state that each main sys-
tem may have sub-systems
inside, these swimlanes are
not separated as each one is
part of each other.
Table 4.2: CASLC swimlanes table
Figure 4.2 shows how the CAS swimlane is separated into three sub-swimlanes,
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presenting its stages individually, with each stage containing the functions that can
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Figure 4.2: CASLC Activity diagram
It is worth noting that so far we have only modeled a CAS and its CASLC.
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Adaptation mechanisms will not be considered in this thesis.
4.3.1 Extending the Activity diagram to support the ex-
tended Use Case diagram
To enable an Activity diagram to describe the extended version of Use Case diagram
introduced in the previous Chapter, further extensions are necessary. These are as
follows:
• Context Information Store (CIS): this contains all the gathered context in-
formation during function execution; this store is continuously checked and
updated in order to ensure whether or not the user has applicable CI to invoke
the required function. The CIS mechanism is considered as an internal part
of the system, it is similar to a database, but it is very dynamic.
• Context links: these show how the context data can flow in an Activity di-
agram, and also depict how the decisions can be made. These links do not
partake in object flow, and therefore they differ from the other links.
• Function Requirements (FR): this is to depict the required CI that must be
fulfilled to perform the function.
Table 4.3 shows the proposed enhancements to the Activity diagram notations,
which help to explain the extended Use Case diagram.
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Contains all gathered CI
Context
links
This is not part of control
flow; it is only to show how






This contains the required
CI and constraints that
must be addressed to carry
out the function.
Table 4.3: Proposed notations to enhance the Activity diagram to present the ad-
justed Use Case diagram
Note that some relationships in the Activity diagram have been coloured to show
both how the CAS works in detail, and how the system checks the condition before
invoking any system function.
As shown Figure 4.3, the CIS is connected with the action state << Get CI >>
in order to store the gathered CI. This saved CI is then continuously checked in or-
der to ensure whether or not the CI is consistent with the required or running
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function. Each function has a certain CI, which is stated in the FR, and there-
fore once the user invokes a function, the system checks whether s/he has ad-
dressed the requirements for the selected function. That is achieved through the
condition << Is CI consistent with requested function >>; this verification
is made in both the CIS and the FR at the same time. When a service is run-
ning, the system verifies that the CI has not changed after a limited period of
time. If the answer to this verification is ’yes’, the CIS will again capture the CI
and update the CIS through the action state << Get a new CI >>, and then
the CAS rechecks the new CI against the FR to determine whether or not the CI
is still applicable for continuing to use the service. This verification is done by
<< Is CI still applicable for current function >>.
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Figure 4.3: CASLC Activity diagram with proposed enhancements
As explained earlier, the CI is the key to extending the Use Case diagram in
order to model a CAS. Therefore, the benefits of proposing both the new relation
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<< Require >> and Use Case << CI Use Case >> can be presented in the
Activity diagram by showing the conditions that verify whether or not the current
user CI matches the required function. Thus, once the required CI is satisfied, then
the service/function will be granted accordingly. The gathered CI, as can be seen
in Figure 4.3, is continually updated and checked.
First, let us have an example to illustrate what has been explained above in order
to show the value of our proposed extension on the Use Case diagram in modeling
a CAS.
Let us consider a library system: it is assumed that the Librarian wishes to utilise
the library system to check the books that have been borrowed. The library system
requires the Librarian to only invoke this service inside the library and between the
hours of 8:00 and 21:00.






Figure 4.4: Check books Use Case
We can use our extended Activity diagram as shown Figure 4.5 to present the
library Use Case scenario.
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Figure 4.5: Check books Activity diagram
As it can be expected, the CI plays major role in controlling the << Check b-
ook >> function. Thus, Figure 4.5 demonstrates the ability of the enhanced Activ-
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ity diagram in modeling the Use Case diagram. Notably the impact of the changing
CI on system functions is explicitly represented. This was not possible with tradi-
tional Activity diagram.
4.3.2 Gathering security requirements for CASs using the
extended Activity diagram
Activity diagrams are generally used to show the system process workflow. This
can assist in defining where the system security requirements can be performed.
Therefore, we seek out to develop a notations to model the key security requirements
also within an Activity diagram. We leverage upon the outcome of the similar effort
put for a Use Case diagram in previous Chapter.
• Authentication: in the extended Use Case diagram, the login Use Case was
exploited to present the process of capturing the required authentication pa-
rameters. Therefore, the Activity diagram will describe this through a set
of action states that show how to authenticate and validate the CAS user’s
identity.
• Authorisation: this was presented in the Use Case diagram as a mechanism
for showing when the function can be either permitted or denied. Hence, this
process will be depicted here in an extended Activity diagram through a set
of action states in order to manage the user authorisation process.
• Confidentiality: the extended Use Case diagram exploited user location to
manage the hidden data, and therefore this will be fully illustrated in the
enhanced Activity diagram; it will be done through a set of action states that
are used to protect and hide any user-sensitive information.
• Integrity: this security requirement could not be captured in the extended
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Use Case diagram because it needed an initial node and a final node, and the
extended Use Case diagram did not provide such elements. However, we find
out the Activity diagram is capable of presenting the integrity process; it can
be done through a set of action states that are used to ensure that the data
are not corrupted or modified by unauthorised persons or any third party.
Generally, one action state or a group of action states in an Activity diagram may
present a certain type of security requirement (based on performance). For example,
the<< Login >> action state is adequate for expressing the authentication process,
whereas we use a number of action states to explain the data integrity mechanism.
To present the key security requirements in an Activity diagram, we develop
some extended notations. It relies on suitable icons, and is summarised in Table
4.4. The lock symbol is used to state the security concept, and two letters are used
to identify the specific security requirement.
Authentication Authorisation Confidentiality Integrity
AC AR CO IN
Table 4.4: Icons used to present the security requirements in the extended Activity
diagram
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4.3.2.1 Authentication
The authentication stage in an Activity diagram can be presented by the <<
Login >> action state, which mainly concerns verifying the user identity. To check
the user identity in a CAS, we may use several verification parameters together,
such as static and physical ones (user name/password, device IP, etc.) and dynamic
CI ones (location, time, etc).
Login
Start
Figure 4.6: Present Authentication by login action state
Thus, in order to express how the CI can be used to verify user identity as well as
to fully spell out the authentication procedure in a CAS, we have therefore expanded
the << Login >> action state; authentication stage passes through many action
states, starting with << Enter user details >>, through verifying the user identity,
until reaching the action stage << Show system function >>, as shown 4.7.
84
CHAPTER 4. ENHANCING THE ACTIVITY DIAGRAM TO SUPPORT THE
EXTENDED USE CASE DIAGRAM FOR CASS AND GATHER THEIR
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Get CI
Are entered details 
valid?
Here we can use any verification











Figure 4.7: Expanded login action state
Figure 4.7 shows that, as the user enters the required details, the CAS gath-
ers the user CI, and then all of this information is verified through the following
condition << Are entered detail valid >> in order to check whether or not the
user is authorised to access the system. If ‘yes’, all the system functions will be
displayed by the action state << Show system functions >>; otherwise, access
will be denied. However, authentication as we have just described needs yet to be
positioned within a CASLC. This is done in Figure 4.8.
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Context Aware System
Acting stageReasoning stageAcquistion stage
User
Get CIEnter Login details








Figure 4.8: Authentication with CASLC
To further demonstrate our extended notation, we return to the liberian example
and focus on the login phase. Its Use Case diagram is presented in Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9: Library system login Use Case
The user << Librarian >> wishes to access the library system. S/he is required
to enter the necessary authentication details, which are: username/password and a
certain location (for example, within the library boundary). Then, once the details
have been processed, the CAS checks whether the user has satisfied the necessary
authentication parameters.
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Figure 4.10: Librarian Authentication process
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Figure 4.11 also demonstrates our notations for identifying the authentications
process. Our dedicated AC icon has been stretched to cover all elements in the
Activity diagram that pertain to this security requirement.
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Figure 4.11: Determining the Authentication process during CAS
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Having illustrated Authentication in detail, we will use only the login action
state in the following for the sake of simplicity. This sharpens the focus on the other
key security requirements.
4.3.2.2 Authorisation
Authorisation can be presented in an Activity diagram without adding additional
elements to the proposed Activity diagram framework. Authorisation needs to be
checked frequently and through various conditions in order to ensure that the user
has full permission to perform the selected function. Therefore, user privileges
must be dynamic and continuously monitored in order for the system to address
the mobile nature of the CAS behaviour. As explained above, CI can manage the
function privileges, which precisely describes the authorisation behaviour.
Login Get CI
Using system







Figure 4.12: Basic concept of Authorisation mechanism
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As depicted, authorisation process is required whenever the user requests any
available system function. It is necessary to highlight the context-aware condition
checker << Is CI consistent with requested function >> ; this checks whether or
not the required CI is adequate for invoking a CAS functions.
Context Aware System












Figure 4.13: Authorisation mechanism with CAS
Returning to our main running example of library system, the librarian wishes
to << Check books >>; to do this s/he needs to address all the required CI, such
as location (in our example, across the library) and time (between 8:00 and 21:00);
these constraints would be compulsory for all students. We can represent this in an
Activity diagram through << Is CI consistent with requested function >> as in
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Figure 4.14.
It can be seen that the authorisation condition occurs in the reasoning stage.
Having defined how/where the authorisation procedure can be done, we can develop
the Activity diagram that unveils the full details of authorisation within a CAS.
This can be found in Figure 4.14.
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Figure 4.14: Authorisation within CAS Activity diagram
Figure 4.15 also demonstrates our notations for identifying the authorisation
process. Our dedicated AR icon has been stretched to cover all elements in the
94
CHAPTER 4. ENHANCING THE ACTIVITY DIAGRAM TO SUPPORT THE
EXTENDED USE CASE DIAGRAM FOR CASS AND GATHER THEIR
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS






Is CI consistent with 
requested function
Using system
Has saved CI 
changed
Get a new CI
Is CI still applicable 
for current function
Adapt a new CI


























Figure 4.15: Determining the Authorisation process during CAS
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4.3.2.3 Confidentiality
We have already discussed our approach of protecting potentially sensitive informa-
tion on the user depending on the user location. Therefore by checking the location
information, the system can control the decision over whether to hide or make
available any requested service. Confidentiality in an Activity diagram is achieved
through many steps. For seek of presentation, we assume that:
the service has been already granted to the user, which means the user
has already passed authorisation. Then, the CAS in its turn will con-
tinually check only the user location to control that service. Most im-
portantly, the CAS also checks whether or not the user is located in a
safe place before running that service.
The Activity diagram 4.16 fully illustrates this procedure.
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Login Get CI
Is CI consistent with 
function requested
Check if the user in 
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Figure 4.16: Basic concept of Confidentiality mechanism
Confidentiality as we have just described needs yet to be positioned within a
CASLC. This is done in Figure 4.18.
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Context Aware System
Acting stageReasoning stageAcquisition stage
User
Login Get CI
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with requested 
function
Check if the user in 
public place
















Figure 4.17: Confidentially with CASLC
As can be seen in Figure 4.18, the confidentiality states are distributed through-
out CAS stages, based on each state’s nature and behaviour. However, these states
need to be joined in the whole CAS framework; this will greatly assist in showing
how/when the data can be concealed during any CAS execution, as presented in
Figure 4.18.
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Figure 4.18: Confidentiality within CAS Activity diagram
also with confidentiality, the Activity diagram can be enriched to express the
complete details of the CAS that orchestrates this important requirement. Our CO
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icon be suitably drown, as Figure 4.19 shows.
User Context Aware System
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Figure 4.19: Determining the confidentiality process during CAS
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4.3.2.4 Integrity
We already observed that Integrity cannot be captured at the level of a Use Case
diagram. However, it can be described now using an Activity diagram. This type of
security requirement is concerned with ensuring that the data are as described and
in original condition, so the requirement is designed to prevent any modifications
by unauthorised persons and to protect all data from corruption. We assume that:
the user has already satisfied the required CI and accordingly the service
has already been granted. More specifically, once a service is invoked,
the CAS immediately and in parallel creates a record that has a unique
number, and that contains all relevant connection details, namely the
user CI and the function invoked.
To record the CI, we propose the use of a table that be updated continuously.
This table has a unique number per each user and that contains all relevant connec-
tion details, namely the user CI and functions invoked. The table should contain at
least three lines, but extended to record additional information driving form future
needs. The first line contains the name of the entity, which could be a virtual iden-
tity such as a number, a name, etc. The second line contains entity CI such as user
location, time, user name, etc. Finally, the third line shows the functions available
to entity, for instance, download, upload, etc. The table is continuously updated
and monitored in order to ensure that the entity details are up-to-date and hence
reliable while the system function.
This table containing user records can be profitably used to establish Integrity
of the crucial data, namely user CI and function invoked; it can be demonstrated
by means of an Activity diagram that describes its use as it can be seen in Figure
4.20.
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Figure 4.20: Basic concept of Integrity mechanism
Its Activity diagram shows that a process that commences onec a user gains
access to a service, the CAS gathers the user’s current CI and saves it in a user record,
so that when s/he invokes any action within that service or moves to another one,
the CI is changed accordingly; the system in this case will then access and update
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the user record.
Thus, the record is checked serval times; the important once are twice; the first
time is whilst the service is running (and the CI is changed), and the second is once
the service has been terminated by the user. The system will check before saving any
data whether the record has been changed. This is shown in Figure 4.21, where the
full CAS, expressing also integrity of crucial user data, is presented. In particular,
it can be seen how our IN icon pinpoints the integrity requirement being captured.
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Figure 4.21: Integrity within CAS Activity diagram
The Activity diagram 4.21 shows that, the general processes for checking data
integrity is lengthy; it starts by invoking a system function through the << Start -
using system >> action state, and then a user record is automatically generated
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through the action state << Create data record >>. the data record will be saved
in CIS. Following this, that record is checked by the condition << Has saved CI b-
een changed >>; if ’yes’, then the system will check the data record through <<
Check data record >>, and if not, the user will continue to use the service.
After verifying the data record, the system checks whether the record has been
modified; if ’yes’, then the user will be disconnected through the << Disconnect >>
action state, and it will then save the data, but if not, the service will then be
continued, and so on. Finally, once the user decides to end the current function
(through << Terminate service >>, the system will run a final check to ensure
that the recorded data have not been corrupted; this is done through the condition
<< Final checking has data record been modified >>. Finally, all the user’s
details are saved. The rest of the diagram shows that the data integrity is traced,
and thus any unauthrised access can be prevented.
Also with Integrity, the Activity diagram can be enriched to express the complete
details of the CAS that orchestrates this important requirement. Our IN icon be
suitably drown, as Figure 4.22 shows.
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Figure 4.22: Determining the Integrity process during CAS
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4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter extends the Activity diagram technique coherently with the extension
advanced before for the Use Case diagram technique.
More precisely, the Chapter started clarifying the limitations that hinder those
notations in modeling CAS behaviour. The Chapter proposed a general framework
that is able to model and show the dataflow within a CAS.
Then the Chapter demonstrated the proposed adjustments on the Use Case
notations by extending also the Activity diagram notations. This Chapter presented
an example in terms of its Use Case diagram first, and of its Activity diagram later.
These examples support the evaluation of our innovative contribution to modeling
CASs using UML.
Finally the Chapter demonstrated how to model all the key security requirements
(Authentication, Authorisation, Confidentiality and Integrity) by means of an Ac-
tivity diagram, In particular, it showed how CI can play a major role in securing any
CAS, in the authentication stage (which can use static and dynamic parameters),
in the authorisation stage (which can be managed by certain CI to control user
privileges), and in the confidentiality stage (which exploits user location in order to
organise the intensive data display). At the end, an innovative technique for tracing
data integrity within a CAS was advanced and also demonstrated using an Activity




Enhancing the State diagram to
support the extended Use Case
diagram for CASs and gather their
security requirements
Objectives:
• To describe the State diagram elements
• To extend them in order to model CASs
• To extend them in order to capture all the key security requirements
• To verify whether the required extensions are in line with those previously
advanced on other diagrams
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5.1 Introduction
No previous study has been dedicated to modeling CASs and capture CI using State
diagram techniques. Therefore, an original framework that uses a State diagram to
describe object movement in CASs is proposed here.
The main purpose of exploiting State diagram is at least twofold. First, State
diagram is good at describing the behaviour of an object across several Use Cases
[92]; second, as CAS is dynamic in nature, then using State diagram is very fruitful
to present the object mobility during a CAS functioning [72].
The following treatment shows at the level of State diagram how CI influence a
CAS, thus reconfirming what the previous Chapters found out at the different level.
5.2 Existing State diagram elements
Although a State diagram consists of several elements, it is useful to recall here the
main ones that will assist us in modeling a CAS [115].
• Initial state: an initial pseudo state represents a default vertex that is the
source for a single transition to the default state of a composite state. There
can be at most one initial vertex in a region. The outgoing transition from
the initial vertex may have a behaviour, but not a trigger or guard.
• State: state model is a situation during which some (usually implicit) invariant
condition holds. The invariant may represent a static situation such as an
object waiting for some external event to occur. However, it can also model
dynamic conditions such as the process of performing some behaviour (i.e.),
the model element under consideration enters the state when the behaviour
commences and leaves it as soon as the behaviour is completed).
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• Transition: a transition is a directed relationship between a source state and
a target state. It may be part of a compound transition, which takes the state
from one state configuration to another, representing the complete response of
the state diagram to an occurrence of an event of a particular type.
• Transition (join/fork): forks and joins have the same notation: either a hor-
izontal or vertical bar (the orientation is dependent on whether the control
flow is running left to right or top to bottom). They indicate the start and
end of concurrent threads of control.
• Self-transition: a self-transition is a transition whose source and target states
are the same.
• Note and constraint: a note (comment) gives the opportunity to attach various
remarks to elements. A comment carries no semantic force, but may CI that
is useful to a modeler.
• End : the final state.
5.3 Enhancements
CAS behaviour can change rapidly based on a context changes [68], and a State
diagram notations are fully capable of presenting object changes based on event
or time; therefore, using state diagram to model CASs clearly becomes a line of
research and development. We start off by developing a skeleton for modeling CASs
using State diagram. This skeleton will be utilised as foundation for all the rest of
this Chapter work.
Generally, a CAS is considered to be part of Mobile computing, and therefore
it is convenient to begin our modeling by defining the main states for any mobile
device behaviour [77], [83], [35]. We identify two essential states for describing
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mobile device behavoure: the first state is << Idle >> (sometimes referred to as
passive), in which nothing can be done until the device senses and responds to the
environment; when this happens, the devices switches to the second state, which is





[Not relevant CI] 
Figure 5.1: General states for mobile device
It can be seen that, the CI plays a major role in controlling the states behaviuor.
This general model will be employed to illustrate the blueprint of a CAS and its
states; for example, the portable device mode in a CAS is initially in the << Idle >>
state, which means that it has satisfied certain specific parameters that have led to
an Inactive state.
In contrast, once these parameters are changed and the surrounding environ-
ment is sensed, the mobile device mode changes accordingly into the << Active >>
state, which means the system moves into an operational mode. Hence, the <<
Active >> state is considered more imperative in modeling CAS states as it de-
scribes when/how the system becomes aware, therefore, it is necessary to decompose
the << Active >> state and express it in depth as sequential substates; this will
assist in expressing object mobility in CASs by defining the relevant states using the
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observation made above as a basis, and specifically taking into account the CI either
in sensing or processing states, we have produced a coherent and reliable skeleton as
Figure 5.2 depicted to detail in details the << Active >> state taking into account
the sequential process of the object within a CAS (from the Sensing and Gathering
CI stage, then passing through the Processing stage, until reaching the Acting stage
in order to deliver the service).
This proposed diagram will be exploited as a foundation model and used in all the
subsequent sections to express the CAS states and later their security requirements.
Active





In this state the gathered
 CI will be continuously 
checked in order to verify
 whether or not it is
 consistent  with the 
required function
Adaptation









If CI changes 
If can be adapted
Continuous gathering
Logout
In this state the system 
will try to adapt the user
 based upon the new 
gathered CI
Get out of the 
range
Figure 5.2: Decomposed Active state
Figure 5.2 indicates that, the << Active >> state is initiated when the CAS
senses the surrounding environment, gathers the required CI, and then processes it
once the user has requested any available function in order to ascertain whether or
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not the CI is appropriate for accessing the requested service. Moreover, the diagram
shows when the function in the CAS can be adapted once the CI has changed. The
Table 5.1 lists all the CAS states and events:
State name Events in state Description






Get out of the
range





This starts once the user requests a function,
which checks whether or not the gathered CI
is consistent with the requested function.




This state indicates that the system is in op-
eration mode, and the service is being per-
formed.
Adaptation If can be
adapted. Can-
not
This state tries to adapt a new CI.
Inactive Out of range.
Log out
This describes the system once there is no
running function.
Table 5.1: Description of Active state
The expressiveness of the diagramming techniques presented above will be demon-
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strated below.
5.3.1 Extending the State diagram to support the extended
Use Case diagram
Having developed a reliable CAS model using a State diagram, it is imperative to
support the extension that was done previously on the Use Case diagram. Chapter
4 introduced appropriate notations for the CIS and Context links in an Activity
diagram. The same notations can be used also in a State diagram. To do this, a
State diagram must yet account the CIS and the Context links. For convenience,
we recall them here:
• Context Information Store (CIS): this contains all the gathered CI during a
function execution; this store is continuously checked and updated in order
to ensure whether or not the user has CI that is applicable for invoking the
required function.
• Context Links: these are to show how the CI can affect the CAS states an
State diagram as well as to depict how any decisions are made. These links
do not partake in object flow, and therefore they differ from the other links.
Accordingly, Figure 5.3 expands Figure 5.2.
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Get out of the range
Figure 5.3: State diagram model with proposed enhancements
To complete our CAS model based on a State diagram, we must yet consider the
CASLC stages of Acquisition, Reasoning and Acting. The reason behind this is to
clarify in which CAS stages the presented states can be performed. This is done in
Figure 5.4.
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Get out of the range
Figure 5.4: State diagram model with CASLC
It can be seen that each stage has certain states that are invoked only in that
stage. As mentioned earlier, the adaption mechanism will not be covered, as we only
focus on the impact of CI on the CAS states.
We are not going to express the function itself in detail, we are rather
going to express how the object in CAS can be moved from state to
anther states.
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In order to evaluate how the enriched State diagram can support the extended
Use Case diagram which showing how CI can control the object in CAS. We will







Figure 5.5: Check book Use Case
We can use our extended State diagram as Figure 5.6shown to present the object
of library Use Case scenario.
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Get out of the range
Figure 5.6: Check book State diagram
This Section has convinced that a State diagram Model can be effectively used
to model a CAS and, in particular, to highlight the role that CI plays. The next
step is to account for security requirements.
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5.3.2 Gathering security requirements for a CASs using the
extended State diagram
A vital reason for using a State diagram here is to describe the object mobility of
CASs, and therefore to model their security requirements (using a State diagram).
It is also necessary to make them dynamic, and this behaviour will be entirely
manipulated by CI. Thus, each security type needs several related states in order
to model and present the required actions. The proposed State diagram model
will be used to show how/when the security type can be invoked till reach the
<< Active >> or << In operation >> state, based on the nature of security type.
This section defines diagramming techniques to capture all the key security re-
quirements within a State diagram. In particular, we shall see that the complications
arising the dynamic nature of CI are only modest, and the resulting diagrams remain
very readable. For convenience, we begin by reviewing the key security requirement
in terms of states:
• Authentication: it is captured by a set of states representing how to validate
the user identity in a CAS.
• Authorisation: it is captured by a set of states representing how to manage
the user authorisation.
• Confidentiality: it is captured by a set of states representing how to protect a
any user-sensitive information.
• Integrity: it is captured by a set of states representing how to ensure that the
transferred data in CASs is not corrupted or modified by unauthorized persons
or any third party.
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5.3.2.1 Authentication
Generally, the user details are utilised in order to verify whether or not that user
is allowed to access the system. There are many context parameters that could be
used to authenticate the user identity, such as username/password, location and
device IP, and they govern the process that occurs between the << Idle >> and
<< Active >> states. This process is detailed by the State diagram in Figure 5.7
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If CI not 
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Figure 5.7: Basic concept of Authentication mechanism
Our diagram shows that, the first state to model a mobile device system is
<< Idle >>; this state is maintained until the device is in range and can sense
the surrounding environment. Then, the user device may be activated, following
which, the CI is gathered. Some of this information is checked in order to verify the
user identity in case the user makes a request to access the CASs through an access
portal. Only two states become possible:
• Authenticated: if the required CI for verifying the user is applicable;
• Unauthenticated: otherwise.
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The following table 5.2 summarises the states and events utilised in modeling
the authentication requirement of a CAS.
State name Events in state Description
Idle Get in the range. Lo-
gout
The initial state.
CI gathering out of range. Contin-
uously check. Request
access
Gathering CI and making it
ready to use once the user
has requested a service.
Access portal If CI applicable. If CI
not applicable
Interface to enter details.
Authenticated Logout User status once the details
are accepted.
Unauthenticated Get out of range User status once the details
are not accepted.
Table 5.2: Description of Authentication states
Finally, once the authenticated user has logged out, the user’s current state is
switched to the << Unauthenticated >> state, and then to the << Idle >> state
once s/he is detected as being out of range. These states need to be defined in terms
of the CASLC in which they can be preformed. Our diagram is modified as Figure
5.8, which also shows the use of CIS and related context link.
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Figure 5.8: Authentication with CASLC
Our latest diagram is the most detailed representations of the authentication
requirement for a CAS using an UML State diagram.
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5.3.2.2 Authorisation
We shall see that also the authorisation requirement can be presented in a State
diagram through a number of appropriate states. We assume that:
the user is already identified and authenticated before reaching this
stage, and therefore we consider the user to be in the active mode.
Thus, the authorisation process in a State diagram commences with the <<
Sensing anew CI >> state; this state is devoted to double-checking whether or not
the user still has valid CI following authentication and prior to authorisation.
Immediately after authentication stage, the user may not be allowed to in state to
access any system functions, as it is likely that the CI will have changed. Therefore,
once the CI has been approved, the user request will be processed and checked
by the << Authorisation policy checker >> state, which may be considered the
fundamental state within authorisation as it decides whether or not to authorise
access to the required service by checking the authorisation parameters.
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Figure 5.9: Basic concept of Authorisation in State diagram
The diagram 5.9 depicts the relevant states that involved for managing the
authorisation function for a CASs. The following Table 5.3 summarises the states
and utilised events.
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State name Events in state Description
Authenticated Request function. Lo-
gout
The user is able to access the sys-
tem functions.
Sensing a new CI Continuous gathering.
CI not changed. Pro-
cess the request
Realising the environment and




CI applicable. CI not
applicable. authenti-
cation CI changed
Here, the system continuously
checks authorisation conditions.
Deny Stay a while in the
same statue
The required service cannot be
performed.
Permit Grant services The required service will be acti-
vated.
In operation Check CI. End func-
tion. Logout
Once the service is being used.
Unauthenticated Stay a while in the
same statue
The system functions will not be
displayed.
Inactive Get out of range This describes the system once
there is no running function.
Idle End The end state.
Table 5.3: Description of Authorisation states
Accordingly, all the aforementioned states will be utilised in order to illustrate
the authorisation function in a CASs as well as to show in which stages they can
be run. The next step is to frame our diagram for authorisation within the CASLC
stages. This is represented in Figure 5.10. It can be seen that the main logic of
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Figure 5.10: Authorisation with CASLC
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5.3.2.3 Confidentiality
How to define confidentiality within a CAS was explained in previous Chapters. It
involved determining specific constraints that hide or release a service. Thus the
user’s location will be exploited as a key parameter for managing the confidentiality
requirement in a State diagram. The State diagram below 5.11 depicts the mecha-
nism for confidentiality in a CAS; it also illustrates how the location parameter can
be used to control CAS functions.
Idle
Sensing location





User  in private 
location






Carry using the running service
Get out of the range
CIS




Verifying  the location
Produce 
the result
Figure 5.11: Basic concept of Confidentiality in State diagram
The reason for starting the presentation of confidentiality by the << In operation >>
state is that we assume that:
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the user has already been authorised to access the required service; the
confidentiality function should be invoked the moment a service is re-
quested, and that service will not be granted until the user has satisfied
all the authentication and authorisation requirements.
Therefore, as Figure 5.11 stated, the main CAS states that are invoked to ensure
confidentiality are firstly the << In operation >> state, which means the service
has been already granted and invoked, and then the CAS state is changed once the
user requests a function to << Sensing location >>; then the result of sensing the
location will be passed to the next state << V erifying the location >>, in this
state, the CAS detects the environment and decides whether it is public or private.
Thus, the service will be granted in accordance with the system decision; if it detects
a public place, then some sensitive information will be hidden, and if not, the whole
service will be released.
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The user is already in active





ing. Produce the re-
sult
Sensing user location only





Check the current lo-
cation. User in private
location. User in pub-
lic location
Deciding whether the user is






Carry using the run-
ning service
Hiding the sensitive infor-
mation while the user is lo-
cated in public place.
Inactive Get out of the range Once a user terminates the
service.
Idle End Final state.
Table 5.4: Description of confidentiality states
Having identified all the CAS states that assist in modeling confidentiality within
a CAS, it is important to frame them within the CASLC stages; this facilities
presenting the whole blueprint for a CAS as well as revealing what functions are
carried out within what stages. For example, it can be seen that the decision on
whether it is safe or not to release the sensitive information or service is taken during
the Reasoning stage.
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Carry using the running
 service
Figure 5.12: Confidentiality with CASLC
From all diagrams that describe the mechanism for protecting the sensitive
user information, and they also demonstrate where/how user confidentiality can
be achieved in a CAS through a State diagram.
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5.3.2.4 Integrity
This type of security requirement concerns protecting data integrity, and seeks to
ensure that it is not modified through any unauthorised source. Therefore, we
would also utilise here the data record approach as explained in Activity diagram
(Chapter 4). State diagrams are outstanding for describing data integrity in a CAS,
as diagram 5.13 clearly shows; they can demonstrate how to model data integrity,
which technically comes after authentication and authorization steps, and, once the
user has already invoked the function to either send or retrieve data.
In order to track any user request and to protect data from unwanted alteration,
a number of states are necessary.
131
CHAPTER 5. ENHANCING THE STATE DIAGRAM TO SUPPORT THE


































Get out of the 
range
Logout
If data not 
corrupted
Process the request 
with a new CI
CI Sensing
Here the system will 
generate a table that contains 
(unique number,User CI  and 
provided function details) .






Figure 5.13: Basic concept of Integrity in State diagram
The following Table 5.5 summarises the states and events utilised in modeling
the Integrity function for a CAS.
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State name Events in state Description
Active Request function This mode is initiated once there is in-
teraction with the environment.
CI sensing Continuous check. Process
the request with a new CI.
Save




Check CI. CI consistent
with a required function. CI
changed
As CI is rapidly changeable, it is im-
perative to keep checking to decide
whether or not the CI is applicable for
the requested function.
Adaptation Can be adapted. Cannot be
adapted
The state that can depict whether or
not the object can be adapted.




Continues updating. If data
corrupted. If data not cor-
rupted
To keep checking whether the data have
been altered.
Disconnected Save This state is initiated on discovering
that the data have been modified.
Storing in D.B Data saved Saving the data.
Inactive Get out of the range Once the service is terminated.
Idle Logout The mode becomes an Idle.
Table 5.5: Description of Integrity states
Through the above, we can guarantee user confidentiality by protecting the data
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from any alteration or unauthorized modification. These states can also be applied
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Figure 5.14: Integrity with CASLC
For example, during the Acquisition stage, the user CI is gathered only through
the << Sensing CI >> state, whereas many states are involved in the Reason-
ing stage, such as << Active >>, << Monitoring data integrity >> and <<
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CI status checker >>. Finally, in the Acting stage, the service is used through the
<< In operation >> state, and is terminated through the << Disconnected >>
state.
5.4 Chapter Summary
This Chapter has provided the general diagram technique for presenting a CAS and
then expressing its security requirements using a UML State diagram. This frame-
work is mainly utilised to demonstrate the extension that was done on the Use Case
diagram by showing the high impact of changing CI on CAS states. These find-
ings indicate that the same enhancements seen in the previous chapter for Activity
diagram scale up to the State diagram level.
The Chapter started by describing in depth the State diagram notations. It also
underlined the limitations that hinder the notations in modeling CAS behaviour.
Accordingly, the Chapter then advanced a general diagramming technique to ac-
count for the changing context in a CAS.
The rest of the Chapter described our techniques for gathering the key security
requirements by leveraging upon the proposed State diagram enhancement. It was
also showed how the CI can play a major role in securing any CAS, either in the
authentication stage, which can use static and certain dynamic parameters, or in
the authorisation stage, which can be managed by certain CI to control the user
privileges, or in the confidentiality stage, which exploits user location in order to
organise the intensive data display. Then, our State diagram presented the way of
tracing data in a CAS in order to check their integrity.
Finally, it can be observed that the diagraming techniques developed in this
Chapter rest on extensions (to the State diagram) that are in line with those made
in previous chapters on Use Case and Activity diagrams respectively.
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• To introduce an M-learning system(definition - structure - work explanation)
• To define the M- Learning users and their functions
• To define the security requirements for M-learning
• To model the M-learning system functions using the UML diagrams
• To model the security requirements for an M-learning system using UML di-
agrams
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6.1 Introduction
The main aim of this work is to extend existing UML diagrams elements; specifically,
the Use Case diagram is extended to model a CAS, and then to capture its security
requirements, and the proposed framework for both Activity and State diagrams will
demonstrate that extension. Accordingly, this Chapter presents a case study in order
to apply the proposed modifications on a real-world system; this is conducted in the
M-learning environment. M-learning is a classic example of a system that needs
to be context aware if it is to function properly. It is necessary for the M-learning
system to be aware of the user’s changing requirements for two main reasons: the
mobility of the users and the diversity of the devices (such as smartphones, personal
digital assistants (PDAs), etc.).
Education methods have passed through many evolutionary stages to reach the
M-learning stage. This started with the traditional approach of face-to-face learning,
and then passing on to e-learning with the advances in technology. M-learning
methods are becoming common in the educational environment and are thought
of as representing the future of learning, in which mobile systems and bricks-and-
mortar universities will complement each other.
6.2 M-learning definition
The M-learning technology is one step ahead of e-learning, as users are free to access
lessons and download material onto their mobile devices with unlimited choice in
terms of location and time. This new technology has dramatically changed the con-
cept of delivering lessons, as the user is not required to physically attend lessons in a
classroom. The main concept behind M-learning represents a shift of environment,
mainly from wired to wireless technologies in order to make the learning experience
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more flexible and accessible for users.
6.3 M-learning Infrastructure
To better understand the concept of M-learning, we consider here a real-world case
study, which is about an infostation-based M-learning system [42]. The infostation
system paradigm was initially posited by Frenkiel et al [119], and entails short-range
communication between wireless nodes. This service enables the user to maintain
an uninterrupted service when moving between different infostations. The major
idea behind this system is to allow the user to access M-learning services, such as
m-lecture, m-tutorial and m-test, and also to use a range of other communication
services, such as private chat, intelligent message notification and phone calls; all of
these are performed through portable devices such as phones, laptops and PDAs.
The M-learning system is principally comprised of three aspects, as described below:
• Central Infostation (CenStat): this is the system server that controls all trans-
actions and functions. This can also be used to save all the data and to send
requested files to the user via the context information provider (CIP).
• Context Information Provider (CIP): these are generally considered as nodes
that are deployed regularly on the university boundary in order to cover all
university faculties. Each CIP can be accessed by different mobile nodes using
various technologies (such as Wi-Fi, Local Area Network (LAN) or Bluetooth).
• Mobile devices: these can be used to utilise the available services, and include
mobile phones, laptops and PDAs; these mobile devices are used by multiple
users such as students, lecturers and administrators.
There are three levels in the architecture of the infostation-based M-learning
system, as depicted in Figure 6.1:
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Figure 6.1: The three-tier architecture of the infostation-based network
6.4 Description of M-learning system
The M-learning system provides several functions/services to users; however, each
service/function has special and required CI and constraints. These constraints
are already predefined and stored in the CenStat in order to match them with
any user-required function. User CI is essentially gathered through many sensors
that are deployed within the university boundary and then automatically saved in
the CenStat database; for example, when a user attempts to access an M-learning
service, the current user CI is gathered by the CIP and relayed to the CenStat. The
CenStat then matches the CI with the given constraints to allow or deny the user
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access to that particular service. To better define and track the user, the university
environment is divided into geographical boundaries based on the locations of the
CIPs, each of which may cover a complete university faculty. Therefore each CIP
can provide different services to the users, for example faculty-based information or
general announcements. Figure 6.2 depicts how CIPs could be deployed around the
university campus (at key points to provide a uniform service):
CIP DI  
CIP BI  
CIP AI  







Central Infostationtr l I f t ti
User Dr 
Figure 6.2: University environment divided in accordance with deployed CIPs
We begin by putting our focus on a user who is in the service area of one of the
university’s CIPs. The system under consideration is an M-learning environment,
and hence, it is assumed that the service area is defined by the coverage of the
wireless signals from the CIP. The next step starts with the user trying to access a
system service; before being able to access a service, the user first needs to register
with the system through the CIP. All user information will be passed to the CenStat,
which will check whether the user is an existing one or new, and then will search
the user identity in its database of existing users.
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In the case of using an M-learning system for the first time, the user will be
required to complete user details on a special entry page; both these details and
the user CI will be processed and stored in the CenStat database. In another
scenario, if the user is already registered, the system will gather the user CI, such as
location, time, user name, user status, etc., and create a special record that contains
the entire user CI during the connection. Once the registration is approved, the
m-system will send an acknowledgement to the user and display all the available
functions/services. In this case, the system will constantly monitor the user’s moves
and update his/her newly created record accordingly. The user is therefore allowed
to choose any available system service and can access it through their mobile device.
Once the user requests a service, the CIP will pass this request to the CenStat,
which in turn will check whether or not the current user CI is sufficient to grant the
required service. If so, the service will be granted, otherwise the user request will
be rejected and the user will be informed of the reason.
Whilst accessing the M-learning system, the CIP will keep track of the user
moves as well as monitor any user CI changes, and will then update the CenStat
accordingly; all user information will be saved in the user-created record. Moreover,
the CIP will also check the user’s device type, and then pass it to the CenStat in
order to respond to the user with the most applicable format.
6.5 M-learning system users and functions
It is imperative to State that we assume that all the user duties must be performed
within the university campus. The M-learning system is mainly designed to be used
by the following users:
• Student: These are intended to be the main users of the M-learning system;
they have a variety of services available to them. The students are classified
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based on their Study Academic Year (S.A.Y), for example foundation year,
first year, second year and final year, therefore each of the M-learning system
services is designed accordingly to the following:
– Download materials: this service allows the students to access their lec-
tures using portable devices.
– View materials: this service allows the students to display the relevant
course materials. Therefore the user device should be compatible with
the required materials.
– Make test: having a testing service is crucial to the efficacy of the M-
learning system. The m-test allows the students to take their exams and
submit them, and then receive their results via their mobile devices.
– Make Private chat: This service provides a private forum for two (or
more) students within the same CIP range. Thus, the student is free to
choose from a list of available students with whom to chat. In addition,
the user can select chatting types, such as the face-time service for privacy
purposes; however, this service will not always be available as the system
will have to check that there is no other student nearby.
• Lecturers: a lecturer is allowed to perform only two functions in the M-learning
system: upload materials and mark student exams.
– Upload materials: the lecturer can utilise this service in order to upload
both lecture materials and student exams; the uploaded files should be
consistent with all lecture formats, whether text, video or audio. This
service requires a high connection speed in order to quickly upload all the
necessary materials.
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– Mark student exams: this service enables the lecture to access the com-
pleted student exams and mark them. This needs a high speed and secure
connection.
– Make Private chat: this is the same service that is provided to the stu-
dents, as mentioned above.
6.6 Capturing the key security requirements for
M-learning system functions
The M-learning system is subject to all the key security requirements treated earlier
in this thesis (Authentication, Authorisation, Confidentiality and Integrity). As
illustrated above, the university boundary is divided into four distinct geographical
regions, and these are named A, B, C and D. Each geographical region may contain
one university faculty, and thus each part has special and different privileges based on
faculty regulations and policies. Accordingly, these policies will assist in determining
the security requirements for the M-learning system functions, and examples for this
system are given below.
6.6.1 Authentication
This is an essential requirement for any M-learning system, and is invoked at the
earliest stage of using the system. This step is designed to guarantee that the
accessing user is not an imposter; only after this has been satisfied is the user
allowed to access the system and view its functions. Thus, in order to authenticate
system users, accordingly two kinds of context parameters are specified that must
be addressed in verifying the user identity, as follows:
• Static parameters: user name/password.
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• Dynamic parameters: user location.
In this case study, the verification of both parameters are required. Thus, the
user is required to enter the username and password, and the CAS verifies the user’s
location in order to check whether or not s/he is within the allowed boundary. Only
once the appropriate and valid details are provided, can the user access the CASs.
The CAS will continue to monitor the user’s movement, and therefore once the CAS
senses and realises that the user has left the CASs signal coverage area, the service
is terminated accordingly. Therefore, to continue accessing that service, s/he will
need to register again.
6.6.2 Authorisation
This type of security requirement follows the authentication stage; it is devoted to
managing access to the system functions. Therefore, in this case study, we utilize
certain CI to achieve this, for instance, user location, time and user status. Thus,
the user must address all of these predetermined CI data in order to access the CAS
functions. However, each function requires its own CI in order for it to be accessed,
as follows:
• Download Materials: firstly, this service can be only delivered to the user once
s/he is enrolled in the relevant faculty. Therefore the CAS will check the
user status first to ensure that s/he belongs to the relevant faculty. The user
is required to be within the university campus boundary whilst downloading
materials. In respect of time and university regulations, the student must
typically invoke this service between 8:00 and 21:00.
• View Materials: in order to invoke this service the user must be within the
university boundary.
144
CHAPTER 6. A REAL-WORLD CASE STUDY: AN INFOSTATION-BASED
M-LEARNING SYSTEM
• Do exam: this service is strictly controlled by the CAS; it prevents the use of
any other CAS services during the exam. Consequently, the CAS changes the
student status to << Offline >> once the exam has started. Moreover, this
service is also subject to a specific timeframe which means there is limited time
to start and finish the exam. Also, the user must be located in a predefined
location.
In this case, the CAS will verify each student’s identity using some physical
identification methods, such as speech-recognition or fingerprint. Should the
online connection be lost for any reason during the exam, the user must return
to the m-test within a predefined number of minutes; otherwise, s/he will
forfeit the opportunity to complete the exam on the same day.
In the case of the m-test becoming dysfunctional (and dropping the connec-
tion), the saved CI will help the CAS to restart the exam from the point of
disconnection. However, this can only be done with human intervention based
on approval by the invigilator.
• Upload Materials: this service is divided into two main services as follows:
– Upload lectures: to invoke this service, the lecturer is required to be
within the university boundary.
– Upload exam: this service is crucial, and therefore requires strict con-
straints. The lecturer must be located in his/her office and not be con-
nected to any other CAS service; accordingly, the lecturer’s status will
automatically become << Offline >>.
• Mark student exam: this service also is designed for the lecturer, and can
only be performed in the lecturer’s office, and thus the lecturer’s status will
accordingly be << Busy >>; therefore, s/he must not be connected to any
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other service.
• Make private chat: the service is only available using the university network;
also, the user status must be online to establish any chat.
6.6.3 Confidentiality
This is used to protect sensitive user information from unauthorised persons. In an
M-learning environment, the exam tests are most sensitive, and the examiner must
keep them confidently, from student specially. The user location is the key context
element in achieving this. We will accordingly consider the M-learning service that
needs high levels of confidentiality.
• Upload exam: this service is devoted to lecturers, and to favour confidentially
of the exam tests, the key condition to access this service is that it must be
done in the lecturer’s office. This means that only the office is a consider a safe
location, and therefore if the lecturer invokes this service and moves outside
his/her office, the CAS will sense that, and will then hide any test details
accordingly.
6.6.4 Integrity
This type of security requirement concerns ensuring that the user data cannot be
modified during transmission over work, and it thereby allows the user to move
within the system boundary and to switch from one CIP to another. The purpose
of an M-learning system is to send and receive data, and during these operations the
CAS must check that the data are not modified or corrupted. Accordingly, in this
case study, we seek to protect the user’s connection whilst utilising the M-learning
system; in addition, the data must not be affected once the CI has changed. For
example, once the user connects to a CIP and starts invoking a CAS function, and
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should that user then move from one CIP to another, the CAS must ensure that no
data are altered during the transition.
6.7 Modeling the M-learning system using UML
This section demonstrates on the M-learning case study the proposed extensions
and enhancements that have been done in this thesis on the UML diagrams in order
to model a CAS. We have seen that UML can be utilised to model and specify CAS
functions and behaviour. UML has several diagrams, each of which is designed for
specific purposes. This case study by means of Use Case diagram, Activity diagram
and State diagram. Therefore the aforementioned functions will be fully presented
by these diagrams. As documented fully in the preceding chapters, the Use Case
notations are not mature enough to cope with and present CAS functions or to
define their security requirements, and consequently extensions have been advanced
to enable the Use Case notations to address this shortcoming. This then necessitated
developing corresponding extensions for both the Activity and State diagrams to
support the Use Case extension (Chapter 4 and 5).
6.7.1 Use Case diagram for the system
This diagram of UML is mainly concerned with defining system functions as well as
capturing security requirements from the user’s point of view. Therefore, it is the
first important step to express the M-learning functions as well as the relevant CI.
This is done using the proposed extension, as in Figure 6.3.
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Figure 6.3: Main Use Case diagram for M-learning
The diagram in Figure 6.3 shows the M-learning system Actors and their possible
functions. In addition, it shows the required CI to carry out each of these functions.
The Tables 6.1, 6.2 list the system Actors, functions and required CI.
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Student function name Required CI
Login Username/password= Valid. Location= All.
Download materials Location= All. Time= 8:00 - 21:00. S.A.Y= 3rd year.
View materials Location= All. Time= 8:00 - 21:00.
Do exam Specified location= True. During specified time= True.
Other activities= Null. User status= Offline.
Make private chat Location= All. User status= Online.
Table 6.1: Student functions
Lecturer function name Required CI
Login Username/password= Valid. Location= All.
Upload lecture Location= All.
Upload exam Location= lecturer’s office. Other activity= Null. User
status= Offline.
Mark student exam Location= lecturer’s office. Other activity= Null.
Table 6.2: Lecturer functions
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We have seen that one of the main function of the M-learning system is <<
Download materials >> Figure 6.4 focuses on it. This function will be modeled
in both Activity and State diagrams in the sequel of this Chapter, while all other








Figure 6.4: Download materials Use Case
The Table 6.3 depicts the description of << Download materials >> Use Case
diagram.
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Main function Download materials
Brief description The student can access the download materials function
once he successfully gains the required CI.
Context Information Location= All. Time= between 8:00 and 21:00. S.A.Y=
3rd year.
Precondition The student must be firstly authenticated, and be in
location A with the time between 8:00 and 17:00.
Post-condition The student must remain having the proper CI.
Flow of events
1. Student requests download materials function.
2. CAS verifies the student‘s CI with required CI.
3. CAS provides the service.
Table 6.3: Download materials Use Case description
6.7.2 Activity diagram for the Download Materials function
As described in Chapter 4, we have enhanced also the Activity diagram in or-
der to demonstrate the value of the Use Case enhancement; these can be seen
in the Activity diagram Figure 6.5 to describe the scenario of the function <<
Download materials >>.
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Figure 6.5: Download materials Activity diagram
6.7.3 State diagram for the Download Materials function
As described in Chapter 5, we have enhanced also the State diagram to demonstrate
the value of the Use Case extension; therefore, these elements are shown in the State
diagram given in Figure 6.6 to model the function << Download materials >>.
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Figure 6.6: Download materials State diagram
To conclude this section, all the proposed extensions and enhancements have
been applied for modeling the CAS through the M-learning function << Download ma-
terials >>.
The extended Use Case diagram shows the required CI that must be fulfilled
before performing the requested function. The Activity diagram depicts the flow
of the << Download materials >> function together with the effect that CI has
on it. Finally, the State diagram illustrates the M-learning states once the user has
invoked << Download materials >> as well as the impact that CI has on the
states.
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6.8 Capturing the security requirements for M-
learning functions using UML
This section captures the security requirements for the M-learning system modelled
above. This is done by utilising the techniques for capturing security requirements
this thesis discussed previously.
6.8.1 Authentication
All UML diagrams developed in the previous chapters will be used here to capture
the authentication requirement for an M-learning system.
6.8.1.1 Using our Enhanced Use Case diagram
As explained above in the security requirements section, there are two required forms
of authentication in the M-learning system; one of them originates with dynamic
behaviour (we saw that the existing Use Case diagram notations are limited in
modeling dynamic behaviour). For example, in order to access M-learning, the user
is strictly required to be inside the university boundary, and therefore it would be
profitable to be able to use some Use Case notations to model this. We observe that
this can be clearly presented by the extended Use Case diagram as shown in Figure
6.7.
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Figure 6.7: Login Use Case
The diagram elements are described in Table 6.4
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Main Function Login Use Case
Brief description
The student can be verified by entering user-
name/password, and meeting other CI such as location.
Once the system approved these, the user can choose
one of the available services.
Security Requirement Authentication
Context Information Usename/Password. Location
Precondition
The Student must be in a certain and known location
as well as using an applicant device.
Post-condition The Student must remain in an authorised location.
Flow of events
1. The user enters username/password.
2. The CAS verifies the user location.
3. The CAS verifies all user access details.
4. The CAS connects the user.
Table 6.4: Authentication Use Case diagram description
6.8.1.2 Using our Enhanced Activity diagram
The CAS is exploited here to present the authentication process through the Activity
diagram; therefore, in order to verify the user, the M-learning system checks the
parameters username/password and user location, as is clearly shown in the diagram
Figure 6.8.
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Figure 6.8: Authentication through Activity Diagram
6.8.1.3 Using our Enhanced State diagram
The State diagram for Authentication describes the user states during the Authenti-
cation process; the Authentication parameters (username/password, user location)
are verified as shown in Figure 6.9.
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Figure 6.9: Authentication through State diagram
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6.8.2 Authorisation
All UML diagrams developed in the previous chapters will be used here to capture
the authrisation requirement for an M-learning system.
6.8.2.1 Using our Enhanced Use Case diagram
As described in Chapter 4, it can be assumed that the user will not reach this stage
until s/he has been authenticated. We consider that the lecturer wishes to access
<< Upload materials >> and then << Upload exam >>; the major reason behind
choosing these services rather than any other M-learning functions is to demonstrate
the sequence of actions, as these functions also need to present confidentiality and















Figure 6.10: Authorisation for upload exam using Use Case diagram
The diagram elements are described in the Table 6.5.
159




Main Function Upload exam
Brief description The lecturer can access the download materials function
once s/he successfully gains the required CI.
Security Requirement Authorisation
Context Information Location= Office. Other activity= Null. User status=
Offline
Precondition The lecturer must be in a certain and known location as
well as using an applicant device.
Post-condition The lecturer must be in location A,B as well as during
the time between 8:00 and 17:00.
Flow of events
1. User requests download materials.
2. The CAS verifies the user CI.
3. The CAS provides the requested function.
4. The CAS continuously checks the user CI.
5. The CAS denies the service once the user CI is not
applicable.
Table 6.5: Authorisation Use Case description
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6.8.2.2 Using our Enhanced Activity diagram
The Activity diagram 6.11 shows the authorisation process for managing the func-
tion << Upload exam >> by following the gathered CI.
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Figure 6.11: Authorisation for upload exam using Activity diagram
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6.8.2.3 Using our Enhanced State diagram
The State diagram 6.12 shows the authorisation process for managing the function
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Figure 6.12: Authorisation for upload exam using State diagram
163
CHAPTER 6. A REAL-WORLD CASE STUDY: AN INFOSTATION-BASED
M-LEARNING SYSTEM
6.8.3 Confidentiality
All UML diagrams developed in the previous chapters will be used here to capture
the confidentiality requirement for an M-learning system.
6.8.3.1 Using our Enhanced Use Case diagram
As presented in the above section, << Upload exam >> needs certain CI to be
performed. The location parameter is one of the required constraints, and we assume
that the lecturer has fulfilled the necessary CI; the service is granted accordingly.
Therefore, in order to demonstrate the confidentiality mechanism, as shown in Figure
6.13, the M-learning system continuously checks the lecturer’s location (i.e. whether
or not s/he leaves the office); if the location changes, the exam information will be










Figure 6.13: Confidentiality for upload exam using Use Case diagram
The diagram elements are describe in Table 6.6.
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Main Function Upload exam
Brief description The lecturer can be verified by entering user-
name/password, and meeting other context information
such as location. Once the system approved these, the
user can choose one of the available services.
Security Requirement Confidentiality
Context Information Location= Office
Precondition The Lecturer must be in a certain and known location
as well as using an applicant device.
Post-condition Lecturer must remain in private location.
Flow of events
1. Lecturer performs (upload exam) services.
2. CAS verifies the Lecturer location.
3. CAS realises that the Lecturer sits in the office.
4. CAS provides the whole such service.
Table 6.6: Confidentiality Use Case description
6.8.3.2 Using our Enhanced Activity diagram
The Activity diagram in Figure 6.14 shows the confidentiality process for managing
the hiding of sensitive information during the execution of the << Uploadexam >>
function.
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Figure 6.14: Confidentiality for Upload exam using Activity diagram
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6.8.3.3 Using our Enhanced State diagram
The State diagram in Figure 6.15 shows the confidentiality process for managing
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Figure 6.15: Confidentiality for upload exam using State diagram
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6.8.4 Integrity
As explained in Chapter 3, the Use Case diagram is inherently inadequate for mod-
eling Integrity, as Integrity behaviour requires tracing a package from its initial
point to its end point; the Use Case diagram is unable to present this process, and
therefore we do must skip this modeling via a Use Case diagram.
6.8.4.1 Using our Enhanced Activity diagram
The Activity diagram below 6.16 depicts the integrity process for the << Upload e-
xam >> function; we assume that the lecturer has already fulfilled the required CI,
and then requests << Upload exam >>. As soon as the service has been provided,
the M-learning system generates a table that contains all transaction details. This
table will be the key to deciding whether or not the data are corrupted.
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Figure 6.16: Integrity for upload exam using Activity diagram
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6.8.4.2 Using our Enhanced State diagram
The State diagram in Figure 6.17 expresses all the states that can present the in-
tegrity process for the << Upload exam >> function; it is assumed that the lecturer
has already fulfilled the required CI, and then requests << Upload exam >>. As
soon as the service has been provided, the M-learning system generates a table that
contains all transaction details. This table will be the key to deciding whether or
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Figure 6.17: Integrity for upload exam using State diagram
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6.9 Chapter Summary
The purpose of this M-learning system case study is to demonstrate the proposed
extension that was done on the Use Case diagram as well as the refinements that
were done on both the Activity and State diagrams; they now have a documented
ability to assist in modeling the CAS and capturing its security requirements. We
recall that the M-learning system is a type of mobile system, which is applied in the
university environment to provide various educational functions to users, including
students and lecturers, so its significance is clear today.
This Chapter is divided into several sections; the first section provided an overview
and definition of the M-learning system as well as explaining its structures. The
subsequent sections illustrated in detail how M-learning works by utilising the in-
fostation system. Then, the modeling of the M-learning system was carried out by
exploiting the extended Use Case diagram, and the enhanced Activity and State
diagrams. Towards the end of this chapter, we described the security-requirement
gathering process for the M-learning system by utilising the enhanced UML dia-
grams that form the core of this thesis.
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Conclusion and Future work
Objectives:
• To summarise the work carried out in this thesis
• To list the main contributions of this work
• To give a statement of evaluation
• To revised the research questions
• To sketch the future work
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7.1 Research Summary
CAS are dynamic in nature and modelling such systems is not trivial. Security
is considered one of major challenges in CAS specially because such systems often
gather sensitive user information; this information may compromise the security
of the system if disclosed to unauthorised users. Thus, the design of a CAS must
consider system security as a major requirement. Although security is traditionally
considered as a non-functional requirement and is delayed to a later stage of the
system development lifecycle, this thesis insists that security must be considered as
early as possible because of its high importance. This is also in line with the “secure
by design” concept.
Therefore, in this thesis the UML diagrams Use Case diagram, Activity diagram
and State diagram have been enhanced in order to enable them to model a CAS and
then capture its security requirements at the earliest possible stage of the software
development process. The summary of the work presented in this thesis is as follows:
The first Chapter sought to introduce the research motivation, the research ques-
tions and scope. Then, we identified the measure of success, and finally outlined the
thesis structure.
The second Chapter presented the background of the topics discussed in this the-
sis. The main topics covered are modelling language ways with a detailed overview
on UML and its diagram types such as Use Case diagram, Activity diagram and
State diagram. The chapter also discussed security requirements and context-aware
systems on its own, and then finally reviewed the work related to security require-
ments and context-aware systems using UML.
The third Chapter initially identified the shortcomings that Use Case diagram
suffer in modelling CAS’s and their security requirements. In the later part of this
chapter, we have described the proposed enhancements to address these limitations;
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and then presented some examples to demonstrate how these enhancements can be
used to model CAS’s and their security requirements.
In Chapter 4, initially an enhancement to Activity diagram was proposed; this
enhancement proposed a framework, which enables to model CAS’s. This enhance-
ment to activity diagrams introduces two separate swim lanes: one representing the
user functions (for e.g. login, request function) and the second represents the CAS
functions (for e.g. get CI). The CAS Swim lane is further sub-divided into three
swim lanes: Acquisition, Reasoning and Acting. These three sub-swim lanes repre-
sents the CAS complete life cycle. These Activity diagrams were used not only to
support the previously enhanced Use Case diagrams but also to tackle the security
requirements for CAS’s.
In the fifth Chapter, we continued our line of enhancements over State diagram
notations. As a result, it became possible to model CASs behaviour, these new
enhancements make it possible to define states which are dynamic and is based on
users CI. Just like Activity diagram, the State diagram is divided into three different
levels to represent the complete life cycle of a CAS. This new addition to the State
diagram, also enables it to gather the security requirements of CAS’s.
In the sixth Chapter, we applied all the proposed work to an M-learning system
case study. This particular M-learning system represents a University boundary,
where online provision of resources is a requirement for both the students and the
staff. Also, this requires separate security provisions for different type of mobile
users with changing context in both spatial and temporal domain.
Thus, modelling of this system and gathering of security requirements shall fully
cater for the CI. This M-learning system is represented with our proposed enhance-
ments, with the extended Use Case diagram and showing how the functions of a
CAS can be modeled, and then continuing on by capturing its security requirement.
Then, we presented one of the main Use Case functions using the proposed Activity
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diagram for the sake of demonstration, deferring a similar treatment of the other
functions to the Appendix. Finally we modeled the example Use Case function by
the enriched State diagram. In the end of this Chapter, we defined how the security
requirements can be gathered for the example M-learning system using our full set
of enhancements.
7.2 Statement of Evaluation
UML is universal graphical modeling language [113], [67], which contains several di-
agrams. UML is generally used to model systems and define requirements on system
functions. UML has been utilised and extended to be appropriate for such areas.
In both CAS and security requirements areas, the UML also has been enhanced
for many purposes such as formalisation aspect and to show adaptation mechanism
[23], [81], [61].
To the best of our knowledge, there is no a single study devoted to model security
requirement for CAS using UML diagrams types (Use Case, Activity and State).
These diagrams were found to be severely limited to present CASs behaviour; also
this was found that it is incapable to show the effectiveness of changing CI on CASs
functions.
There was a requirement to enhance these diagrams to present CAS behaviour.
In the work presented the said UML diagrams were enhanced in order to overcome
those limitations and then also to gather the key security requirements at the early
stage of developing CASs.
The proposed enhancements have added at least the following features:
• Enabling the Use Case diagram technique to properly define and model CAS
functions and the required CI to perform that functions, and allowing for
the gathering of the security requirements for CASs at such an early stage of
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software development.
• Enabling the Activity diagram technique to model CASs as well as to show
the dataflow while executing any system function, and then clearly capturing
CASs security requirements.
• Enabling the State diagram technique to present the various objects in a CAS
by means of a general skeleton to account for the influence of IC in a CAS and
to gather their key security requirement.
Furthermore, in regard to the chosen case study that has been presented in
this thesis, which is probably correct. The M-learning was modelled based on our
proposed enhancements on Use case diagram, Activity diagram and State diagram
in order to represent some particular scenarios.
7.3 Research Questions Revisited
To evaluate the work presented in the thesis, the research questions formulated in
Chapter 1 are revisited here.
The main research question was: How to model CASs and gather its security
requirements using UML?
However, this question poses a couple of questions as follows:
Q1. Are the current form of Use Case notations applicable to modeling a CAS?
Q2. Can the Use Case notations be extended to model a CAS?
Q3. Is the extended Use Case diagram capable to capture all the main security re-
quirements, namely (Authentication, Authorisation, Confidentiality and Integrity)?
All of the above questions were fully answered in Chapter 3 by means of our
enhancements to the Use Case diagram.
In relation to the other target diagrams Activity and State, more questions arose:
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Q4. Are the existing notations of both Activity and State diagram mature to
present the extended Use Case diagram?
Q5. Can the current notations of Activity and State diagram be enhanced to do
so?
These two questions were answered respectively in chapters 4 and 5.
And finally there was a concluding question in term of practicality of the proposed
enhancements, which is:
Q6. Can the proposed extensions for gathering and modeling the security re-
quirements of CAS be practically applicable to real-world case studies?
Chapter 6 presented a case study, where these enhancement have been practically
applied to model a M-learning system.
In summary, the proposed enchantments derived from a deep and synergistic
understanding of two main aspects: one is the nature of CAS and more specifically
the influence that CI plays on the system functions; the other one is the strength
and limitations of existing UML diagramming techniques.
7.4 Contribution to Knowledge
This thesis contributes to knowledge at least in the following ways:
• It provides an in-depth understanding of system modeling in general and in
particular of pros and cons of UML diagramming techniques.
• It shows the main modeling stakeholders for CAS, with a focus on the role of
CI.
• It defines a practical approach to modeling CAS and capture their key secu-
rity requirement using appropriate enhancements to the most common UML
diagram types.
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• It provides the full modeling of real-world case study an infostation based
M-learning system using these enhancements.
7.5 Future Work
Context-aware systems are gaining increasing interest, at least due to the avail-
ability of smart portable devices such as smart phones and mobile services such
as electronic learning and electronic banking. On the other hand, UML is one of
the most widely adopted modelling techniques for a variety of systems development
projects. This thesis began with and under-penning assumption that while UML is
a valuable development tool, UML suffers from a number of limitations in coping
with the distinctive features of CAS. Another startling observation of this thesis is
that challenging task of capturing information systems security requirements in an
early stage of systems development. Despite the above made observations; UML is
a flexible tool that can accommodate enhancements to make it fir for the distinctive
features of CASs and eliciting and documenting systems security requirements.
The enhancements recommended in this thesis have addressed a set of UML Mod-
els (Use Case Modelling, Activity Modelling and State Diagrams); the researcher
will undertake a similar effort to identify UML enhancements necessary to Class
Diagrams, Sequence Diagrams and Deployment Diagrams to make them fit for both
CAS development and security requirements elicitation and modelling.
Another direction of future work is to develop a dedicated Object Constraint
Language (OCL) to clearly describe the various specifications of CASs. Security
requirements need to be both expressed clearly and functionally modelled into the
design of the CAS; hence an OCL will provide such level of sophistication and clear
definition of needs.
Another area of future work will require a survey of industrially utilised devel-
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opment methods and approaches and an assessment of their ability to successfully
develop CASs and elicit their security requirements. Industrially utilised develop-
ment approaches the likes of Microsoft Development Framework would be candidates
for such enquiry and attempts of enhancements.
Another avenue for future work will be to adopt the set of UML enhancements to
other aspect of CAS Development in addition to security requirements elicitation and
modelling for example control and end user support. CASs pose a set of challenges
to systems developers in both the tools used and the approaches deployed. More
and more challenges can be identified to CASs for example the challenges of control
and ownership in cloud computing, the physical challenges in cross border travel
facing mobile phone operators, etc.
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[10] J. M. Almendros-Jiménez and L. Iribarne. Describing use-case relationships
with sequence diagrams. The Computer Journal, 50(1):116–128, Jan. 2007.
[11] S. Almutairi, G. Bella, and A. Abu-Samaha. Specifying security requirements
of context aware system using UML. In Digital Information Management
(ICDIM), 2012 Seventh International Conference on, pages 259 –265, aug.
2012.
[12] G. C. J. Anne Ngu. Context aware actors. In Presented at the Ninth Biennial
Ptolemy Miniconference, Berkeley, CA, 16, February, 2011.
[13] W. Arsac, G. Bella, X. Chantry, and L. Compagna. Multi-attacker protocol
validation. Journal of Automated Reasoning, 46(3-4):353–388, 2011.
[14] M. Baldauf, S. Dustdar, and F. Rosenberg. A survey on context aware systems.




[15] M. Bandinelli, F. Paganelli, G. Vannuccini, and D. Giuli. A context-aware se-
curity framework for next generation mobile networks. In Security and Privacy
in Mobile Information and Communication Systems. Springer Berlin Heidel-
berg, 2009.
[16] J. E. Bardram, R. E. Kjear, and M. Pedersen. Context aware user authenti-
cation supporting. In Proximity Based Login in Pervasive Computing, Proc.
Ubicomp 2003, pages 107–123, 2003.
[17] G. Bella. What is correctness of security protocols?. Journal of Universal
Computer Science, 14(12):2083–2106, 2008.
[18] K. Bittner and I. Spence. Use Case Modeling. The Addison-Wesley Object
Technology Series. Addison Wesley Professional, 2003.
[19] G. Booch, J. Rumbaugh, and I. Jacobson. Unified Modeling Language
User Guide, The (2Nd Edition) (Addison-Wesley Object Technology Series).
Addison-Wesley Professional, 2005.
[20] J. Booch, G. Rumbaugh and I. Jacobson. El Lenguaje Unificado de Modelado.
The Addison-Wesley Object Technology Series. Addison-Wesley, 1999.
[21] F. Braz, E. Fernandez, and M. VanHilst. Eliciting security requirements
through misuse activities. In Database and Expert Systems Application, 2008.
DEXA ’08. 19th International Workshop on, pages 328–333, 2008.
[22] L. Bussard, Y. Roudier, and R. Molva. Untraceable secret credentials: trust
establishment with privacy. In Pervasive Computing and Communications
Workshops, 2004. Proceedings of the Second IEEE Annual Conference on,
pages 122–126, March 2004.
182
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[23] J. Choi. Context-driven requirements analysis. In Proceedings of the 2007 in-
ternational conference on Computational science and its applications - Volume
Part III, ICCSA’07, pages 739–748, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2007. Springer-Verlag.
[24] B. Columbia. Activity diagram modeling standards and guidelines version 1.0.
Information and Technology Management Branch, December 2, 2005.
[25] B. R. Consensus. Building requirements consensus for business process soft-
ware requirements. http://www.building-requirements-consensus.com/, 2008-
2009. [Online; accessed 10-Feb-2011].
[26] M. Covington, P. Fogla, Z. Zhan, and M. Ahamad. A context-aware security
architecture for emerging applications. In Computer Security Applications
Conference, 2002. Proceedings. 18th Annual, pages 249–258, 2002.
[27] V. T. da Silva, R. C. Noya, and C. J. P. de Lucena. Using the UML 2.0
activity diagram to model agent plans and actions. In Proceedings of the
fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent
systems, AAMAS ’05, pages 594–600, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM.
[28] W. Dargie. Context-Aware Computing and Self-Managing Systems. Chapman
& Hall/CRC Studies in Informatics Series. Taylor & Francis, 2010.
[29] D. Desmond F. D’Souza and A. Wills. Objects, components, and frameworks
with UML: the catalysis approach. The Addison-Wesley object technology
series. Addison-Wesley, 1999.




[31] A. K. Dey and G. D. Abowd. Towards a better understanding of context and
context-awareness. In HUC ’99: Proceedings of the 1st international sympo-
sium on Handheld and Ubiquitous Computing, pages 304–307, 1999.
[32] A. K. Dey, G. D. Abowd, and D. Salber. A conceptual framework and a
toolkit for supporting the rapid prototyping of context-aware applications.
Human-Computer Interaction, 16(2):97–166, Dec. 2001.
[33] J. Dong and J. Woodcock. Formal Methods and Software Engineering: 5th
International Conference on Formal Engineering Methods, ICFEM 2003, Sin-
gapore, November 5-7, 2003, Proceedings. Number v. 5 in Lecture Notes in
Computer Science. Springer, 2003.
[34] P. D.Shekar Goud, Ishaq Md. A secured approach for authentication system
using fingerprint and iris. Global Journal of Advanced Engineering Technolo-
gies, Vol1,Issue3, 2012.
[35] C. L. Dym. Structural Modeling and Analysis. Cambridge University Press,
1997.
[36] L. Engelen and M. van den Brand. Integrating textual and graphical mod-
elling languages. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS),
253(7):105–120, Sept. 2010.
[37] T. Farkhani and M. Razzazi. Examination and classification of security re-
quirements of software systems. In Information and Communication Tech-
nologies, 2006. ICTTA ’06. 2nd, volume 2, pages 2778–2783, 2006.
[38] D. Firesmith, B. Henderson-Sellers, and I. Graham. Open Modeling Language
(OML) Reference Manual. Sigs Reference Library Series. Sigs, 1998.
184
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[39] D. G. Firesmith. Analyzing and specifying reusable security requirements. In
Proc. Solid Freeform Fabrication Sym, pages 507–514, 2003.
[40] D. G. Firesmith. A taxonomy of security-related requirements. International
Workshop on High Assurance Systems (RHAS’05), 2005.
[41] L. B. Frank Armour and M. Sood. Use case modeling concepts for large
business system development. In OOPSLA 95, Workshop on Use Cases, 1995.
[42] I. Ganchev, S. Stojanov, M. O’Droma, and D. Meere. An infostation-based
multi-agent system supporting intelligent mobile services across a university
campus. Journal of Computers, 2(3):21–33, 2007.
[43] H. gerd Hegering. Management challenges of context-aware services in ubiq-
uitous environments. In Proceedings of the 14th IFIP/IEEE Workshop on
Distributed Systems: Operations and Management (DSCOM 2003, pages 246–
259, 2003.
[44] I. Global and I. Association. Enterprise Information Systems: Concepts,
Methodologies, Tools and Applications. Premier reference source. IGI Global,
2010.
[45] C. Haley, R. Laney, J. Moffett, and B. Nuseibeh. Security requirements engi-
neering: A framework for representation and analysis. IEEE Transactions on
Software Engineering, 34(1):133–153, 2008.
[46] L. Han, S. Jyri, J. Ma, and K. Yu. Research on context-aware mobile com-
puting. In Advanced Information Networking and Applications - Workshops,
2008. AINAW 2008. 22nd International Conference on, pages 24–30, 2008.
[47] D. Harel. Statecharts: A visual formalism for complex systems. Science of
computer programming, 8(3):231–274, June 1987.
185
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[48] E. Hayashi, S. Das, S. Amini, J. Hong, and I. Oakley. Casa: Context-aware
scalable authentication. In Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium on Usable
Privacy and Security, SOUPS ’13, pages 3:1–3:10, New York, NY, USA, 2013.
ACM.
[49] X. He, Z. Ma, W. Shao, and G. Li. A metamodel for the notation of graphi-
cal modeling languages. In Computer Software and Applications Conference,
2007. COMPSAC 2007. 31st Annual International, volume 1, pages 219–224,
2007.
[50] K. Henricksen, J. Indulska, T. McFadden, and S. Balasubramaniam. Middle-
ware for distributed context-aware systems. In International Symposium on
Distributed Objects and Applications (DOA), pages 846–863. Springer, 2005.
[51] J. I. Hong. An architecture for privacy sensitive ubiquitous computing. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2nd international conference on mobile systems, applications,
and services, pages 177–189. ACM Press, 2004.
[52] S. H. Houmb, S. Islam, E. Knauss, J. Jurjens, and K. Schneider. Eliciting
security requirements and tracing them to design: an integration of common
criteria, heuristics, and umlsec. Requirements Engineering, 15(1):63–93, 2010.
[53] J. Hu and A. C. Weaver. A Dynamic, Context-Aware Security Infrastructure
for Distributed Healthcare Applications. In Proc. 1st Workshop on Pervasive
Privacy Security, Privacy, and Trust (PSPT), 2004.
[54] V. Illingworth. A Dictionary of Computing. Oxford University Press, Incor-
porated, 1996.
[55] I. Jacobson. Object-oriented software engineering: a use case driven approach.
ACM Press Series. ACM Press, 1992.
186
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[56] I. Jacobson. The Unified Software Development Process. Object technology
series. Pearson Education, 1999.
[57] I. Jacobson, M. Ericsson, and A. Jacobson. The object advantage: business pro-
cess reengineering with object technology. ACM press books. Addison-Wesley,
1995.
[58] H. Janicke, A. Cau, F. Siewe, and H. Zedan. Dynamic access control policies:
Specification and verification. The Computer Journal, 56(4):440–463, 2013.
[59] P. Jones. Fundamentals Of Object-Oriented Design In UML. Pearson Educa-
tion, 2000.
[60] J. Juerjens. Using UMLsec and goal trees for secure systems development.
In Proceedings of the 2002 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, SAC ’02,
pages 1026–1030, New York, NY, USA, 2002. ACM.
[61] J. Juerjens. Secure Systems Development with UML. SpringerVerlag, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2003.
[62] J. Juerjens and P. Shabalin. Automated verification of UMLsec models for
security requirements. In UML 2004 . The Unified Modeling Language. volume
2460 of LNCS, pages 412–425. Springer, 2004.
[63] J. Jurjens. Umlsec: Extending UML for secure systems development. In Pro-
ceedings of the 5th International Conference on The Unified Modeling Lan-
guage, UML ’02, pages 412–425, London, UK, UK, 2002. Springer-Verlag.
[64] M. Kang and K. Taguchi. Modelling mobile agent applications by extended
UML activity diagram. In ICEIS (4), pages 519–522, 2004.
187
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[65] M. Kang, L. Wang, and K. Taguchi. Modelling mobile agent applications in
UML2.0 activity diagrams. In:Proc. of 3rd SELMAS Workshop at ICSE, April
2004.
[66] N. Koblitz and A. Menezes. Another look at security definitions. IACR Cryp-
tology ePrint Archive, 2011:343, 2011.
[67] J. Krogstie and S. Telecom. Evaluating UML using a generic quality frame-
work. In Chapter in UML and the Unified Process, Idea Group Publishing,
pages 1–22. Press, 2003.
[68] S. Lee, S. Park, and S. goo Lee. A study on issues in context-aware systems
based on a survey and service scenarios. In Software Engineering, Artificial
Intelligences, Networking and Parallel/Distributed Computing, 2009. SNPD
’09. 10th ACIS International Conference on, pages 8–13, 2009.
[69] W. Li and A. Joshi. Security issues in mobile ad hoc networks- a survey. Dept.
Computer Science Electrical Engineering, University of Maryland, Baltimore
County., 2007.
[70] J. C. D. Lima, C. C. Rocha, I. Augustin, and M. A. R. Dantas. A context-
aware recommendation system to behavioral based authentication in mobile
and pervasive environments. In Proceedings of the 2011 IFIP 9th International
Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing, EUC ’11, pages 312–319,
Washington, DC, USA, 2011. IEEE Computer Society.
[71] S. Loke. Context-Aware Pervasive Systems: Architectures for a New Breed of
Applications. Taylor & Francis, 2006.
[72] I. Lutkebohle. UML Statechart Diagram. http://www.tutorialspoint.com/
uml/uml_statechart_diagram.htm/, 2008. [Online; accessed 19-July-2012].
188
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[73] A. R. Masoumzadeh, M. Amini, and R. Jalili. Context-aware provisional access
control. In Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Information
Systems Security, ICISS’06, pages 132–146, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006. Springer-
Verlag.
[74] M. C. Matthew, YMatthew, J. Moyer, and M. Ahamad. Generalized role-
based access control for securing future applications. In Proceedings of the
National Information Systems Security Conference (NISSC), October 2000.
[75] J. Mcdermott and C. Fox. Using abuse case models for security requirements
analysis. In Proceedings 15th IEEE Annual Computer Security Applications
Conference, 1999.
[76] A. J. Menezes, S. A. Vanstone, and P. C. V. Oorschot. Handbook of Applied
Cryptography. CRC Press, Inc., Boca Raton, FL, USA, 1st edition, 1996.
[77] A. W. Min, R. Wang, J. Tsai, M. A. Ergin, and T.-Y. C. Tai. Improving
energy efficiency for mobile platforms by exploiting low-power sleep states.
In Proceedings of the 9th conference on Computing Frontiers, CF ’12, pages
133–142, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
[78] M. Mori. A software lifecycle process for context-aware adaptive systems.
In Proceedings of the 19th ACM SIGSOFT symposium and the 13th European
conference on Foundations of software engineering, ESEC/FSE ’11, pages 412–
415, New York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
[79] B. Morin, T. Mouelhi, F. Fleurey, Y. Le Traon, O. Barais, and J.-M.
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Appendix A
Presenting the rest of UML
diagrams
This appendix targets to only present the rest of the UML modeling diagrams for
both the M-learning system functions and the security requirements. This Appendix
is divided into two main sections, the first one is to present the rest of modeling
M-learning system functions, the second is to list the rest of capturing security
requirement for M-learning system.
A.1 Modeling M-learning system functions
A.1.1 Use Case diagram
- View materials
This is to state the required CI in order to perform view materials function
using Use Case diagram.
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Figure A.1: View materials Use Case diagram
- Do exam











Figure A.2: Do exam Use Case diagram
- Make private chat for student
This is to state the required CI in order to make a private chat function using
Use Case diagram.
Student





Figure A.3: Make a private chat Use Case diagram (Student)
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- Make private chat for lecturer
This is to state the required CI in order to make a private chat function using
Use Case diagram.
Lecturer





Figure A.4: Make a private chat Use Case diagram (Lecturer)
- Mark student exams
This is to state the required CI in order perform make student exams function
using Use Case diagram.
Lecturer





Figure A.5: Mark students exams Use Case diagram
- Upload lectures
This is to state the required CI in order to perform upload lectures function
using Use Case diagram.
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Figure A.6: Upload lectures Use Case diagram
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A.1.2 Activity diagram
- View materials







Is CI consistent with 
requested function
Start viewing materials
Has saved CI 
changed
Get a new CI
Is CI still applicable 
for current function
Adapt a new CI































Figure A.7: View materials Activity diagram
- Do exam
This is to state the required CI in order to perform do exam function using
Activity diagram.
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Is CI consistent with 
requested function
Start doing exam
Has saved CI 
changed
Get a new CI
Is CI still applicable 
for current function
Adapt a new CI

































Figure A.8: Do exam Activity diagram
- Make private chat for student
This is to state the required CI in order to perform make a private chat function
using Activity diagram.
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Is CI consistent with 
requested function
Start chatting
Has saved CI 
changed
Get a new CI
Is CI still applicable 
for current function
Adapt a new CI






























Figure A.9: Make a private chat Activity diagram (Student)
- Make private chat for lecturer
This is to state the required CI in order to perform make a private chat function
using Activity diagram.
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Is CI consistent with 
requested function
Start chatting
Has saved CI 
changed
Get a new CI
Is CI still applicable 
for current function
Adapt a new CI






























Figure A.10: Make a private chat Activity diagram (Lecturer)
- Mark student exam
This is to state the required CI in order to perform Mark student exam function
using Activity diagram.
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Is CI consistent with 
requested function
Start marking  exams
Has saved CI 
changed
Get a new CI
Is CI still applicable 
for current function
Adapt a new CI
Is adaptation of 
new CI successful




























Figure A.11: Mark students exams Activity diagram
- Upload lectures
This is to state the required CI in order to perform Upload lectures function
using Activity diagram.
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Is CI consistent with 
requested function
Start uploading lectures
Has saved CI 
changed
Get a new CI
Is CI still applicable 
for current function
Adapt a new CI






























Figure A.12: Upload lectures Activity diagram
A.1.3 State diagram
- View materials
This is to state the required CI in order to perform View materials function
using State diagram.
205














CI change while using 
system





















Figure A.13: View materials State diagram
- Do exam















CI change while using 
system



















-User status:  Offline
Save
Check CI
Figure A.14: Do exam State diagram
- Make private chat for student
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This is to state the required CI in order to perform Make private chat for














CI change while using 
system





















Figure A.15: Make a private chat State diagram (Student)
- Make private chat for lecturer
This is to state the required CI in order to perform Make private chat for














CI change while using 
system





















Figure A.16: Make a private chat State diagram (Lecturer)
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- Mark student exam















CI change while using 
system























Figure A.17: Mark students exams State diagram
- Upload lectures
This is to state the required CI in order to perform Upload lectures function
using State diagram.
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CI change while using 
system






















Figure A.18: Upload lectures State diagram
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A.2 Capturing security requirement for M-learning
system functions using UML
A.2.1 Authentication
All the diagrams that can explain the authentication mechanism using Use
case diagram are already presented in Chapter 6.
A.2.2 Authorisation
A.2.2.1 Using our Enhanced Use Case diagram
This section is to explain the authorisation process using Use case diagrams.
- View materials



















Figure A.19: View materials Authorisation Use Case
- Make private chat
This is to show the authorisation process for making a private chat using Use
Case diagram.
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Figure A.20: Make private chat Authorisation Use Case
- Mark student exam



















Figure A.21: Mark student exam Authorisation Use Case
- upload exam


















Figure A.22: Upload exam Authorisation Use Case
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- Make private chat



















Figure A.23: Make private chat Authorisation Use Case
- Upload exam
















Figure A.24: Upload exam Authorisation Use Case
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A.2.2.2 Using our Enhanced Activity diagram
This section is to explain the authorisation process using Activity diagrams.
- View materials







Is CI consistent with 
requested function
Start viewing materials
Has saved CI 
changed
Get a new CI
Is CI still applicable 
for current function
Adapt a new CI































Figure A.25: View materials Authorisation Activity diagram
- Download materials
This is to show the authorisation process for downloading materials using
Activity diagram.
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Is CI consistent with 
requested function
Start downloading
Has saved CI 
changed
Get a new CI
Is CI still applicable 
for current function
Adapt a new CI

































Figure A.26: Download materials Authorisation Activity diagram
- Do exam
This is to show the authorisation process for doing exam using Activity dia-
gram.
214






Is CI consistent with 
requested function
Start doing exam
Has saved CI 
changed
Get a new CI
Is CI still applicable 
for current function
Adapt a new CI

































Figure A.27: Do exam Authorisation Activity diagram
- Make private chat
This is to show the authorisation process for making a private chat using
Activity diagram.
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Is CI consistent with 
requested function
Start chatting
Has saved CI 
changed
Get a new CI
Is CI still applicable 
for current function
Adapt a new CI






























Figure A.28: Make a private chat Authorisation Activity diagram
- Upload lectures
This is to show the authorisation process for uploading lectures using Activity
diagram.
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Is CI consistent with 
requested function
Start uploading lectures
Has saved CI 
changed
Get a new CI
Is CI still applicable 
for current function
Adapt a new CI






























Figure A.29: Upload lectures Authorisation Activity diagram
- Mark student exams
This is to show the authorisation process for marking student exams using
Activity diagram.
217






Is CI consistent with 
requested function
Start marking  exams
Has saved CI 
changed
Get a new CI
Is CI still applicable 
for current function
Adapt a new CI
Is adaptation of 
new CI successful




























Figure A.30: Mark students exams Authorisation Activity diagram
- Make private chat
This is to show the authorisation process for make a private chat using Activity
diagram.
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Is CI consistent with 
requested function
Start chatting
Has saved CI 
changed
Get a new CI
Is CI still applicable 
for current function
Adapt a new CI






























Figure A.31: Make a private chat Authorisation Activity diagram
A.2.2.3 Using our Enhanced State diagram
This section is to explain the authorisation process using State diagrams.
- view materials
This is to show the authorisation process for viewing materials using State
diagram.
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CI change while using 
system




















Figure A.32: View materials Authorisation State diagram
- Do exam














CI change while using 
system



















-user status = offline
Save
Check CI
Figure A.33: Do exam Authorisation State diagram
Make private chat
This is to show the authorisation process for making private chat using State
diagram.
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Figure A.34: Make private chat Authorisation State diagram
- Upload lectures















CI change while using 
system




Upload lectures  
CI sensing












Figure A.35: Upload lectures Authorisation State diagram
- Upload exam
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Figure A.36: Upload exam Authorisation State diagram
- Mark students exams















CI change while using 
system




















Figure A.37: Mark students exams Authorisation State diagram
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A.2.3 Confidentiality
All the diagrams that can explain the confidentiality mechanism using Use
case diagram are already presented in Chapter 6.
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A.2.4 Integrity
A.2.4.1 Using our Enhanced Activity diagram
This section is to express the integrity process using Activity diagrams.
- View materials
This is to show the integrity process for viewing materials using Activity dia-
gram.
Context Aware System




Start viewingCreate user record
Check data record
Disconnect
Has saved CI 
changed?









Final check: has 
Data record 
modified 






CIS :Location: Office 
Time :10,30










Figure A.38: View materials Integrity Activity diagram
- Make private chat
This is to show the integrity process for making a private chat using Activity
diagram.
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Context Aware System




Start chattingCreate user record
Check data record
Disconnect
Has saved CI 
changed?









Final check: has 
Data record 
modified 






CIS :Location: Office 
Time :10,30











Figure A.39: Make private chat Integrity Activity diagram
- Do exam
This is to show the integrity process for doing exam using Activity diagram.
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Context Aware System




Start the examCreate user record
Check data record
Disconnect
Has saved CI 
changed?









Final check: has 
Data record 
modified 






CIS :Location: office 
Time :10,30





-user status = offline
Save
Check





Figure A.40: Do exam Integrity Activity diagram
- Upload exam
This is to show the integrity process for uploading exam using State diagram.
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Start uploadingCreate user record
Check data record
Disconnect
Has saved CI 
changed?









Final check: has 
Data record 
modified 






CIS :Location: office 
Time :10,30














Acquisition stage Acting stageReasoning stage
Figure A.41: Upload exam Integrity Activity diagram
- Mark students exam
This is to show the integrity process for marking students exam using Activity
diagram.
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Context Aware System
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Disconnect
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Final check: has 
Data record 
modified 






CIS :Location: Office 
Time :10,30












Figure A.42: Mark students exam Integrity Activity diagram
- Upload lectures
This is to show the integrity process for uploading lectures using Activity
diagram.
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Context Aware System
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Check data record
Disconnect
Has saved CI 
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Final check: has 
Data record 
modified 






CIS :Location: Office 
Time :10,30











Figure A.43: Upload lectures Integrity Activity diagram
- Make private chat
This is to show the integrity process for making a private chat using Activity
diagram.
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Context Aware System
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modified 






CIS :Location: office 
Time :10,30











Figure A.44: Make private chat Integrity Activity diagram
A.2.5 Using our enhanced State diagram
This section is to express the integrity process using State diagrams.
- View materials
This is to show the integrity process for viewing materials using State diagram.
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Figure A.45: View materials Integrity State diagram
- Do exam



































Get out of the 
range
Logout
If data not 
corrupted
Process the request 






-User status = Offline
Save
Check CI
Figure A.46: Do exam Integrity State diagram
Make private chat
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Figure A.47: Make private chat Integrity State diagram
- Upload exam
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Save
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Figure A.48: Upload exam Integrity State diagram
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- Upload lectures
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Logout
If data not 
corrupted
Process the request 






Figure A.49: Upload lectures Integrity State diagram
- Mark student exam
This is to show the integrity process for marking student exam using State
diagram.
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Figure A.50: Mark student exam Integrity State diagram
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